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 Executive Summary
Increased regulation of wireless telephone service is being proposed by
both federal and state policy makers, raising the question of optimal jurisdiction.
The case for decentralization (state rules) is strongest when the economic activity
being regulated is localized and market spillovers relatively small.  Alternatively,
the case for uniformity (federal rules) becomes more persuasive when
externalities dictate that efficiency in one state is closely tied to efficient
arrangements in others.  In this situation, balkanization becomes disruptive and
federalism becomes ineffective as firms conform not to diverse standards but (in
the best case scenario) to the most stringent ones.  As an empirical matter,
wireless telephony exhibits strong economies of scale and scope, and national
networks have proven crucial to industry development.  Consolidation of
fragmented license areas has, along with new entry, been instrumental in reducing
rates by 79%, 1993-2002.  Initiating patchwork state rules could threaten such
progress as rules implemented by state commissions are not likely to account for
the broad effect of their rules.  This conclusion is buttressed by a natural
experiment involving the federal government’s 1993 preemption of state
regulation of cellular telephone rates.  Contrary to arguments made by leading
utility commissions (including those of New York and California), rates did not
rise with the elimination of state rate controls.1
Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?
Thomas W. Hazlett
I.  Introduction
  Some states are considering new regulations for wireless telephone service.
1
Alternatively, federal legislation has recently been introduced to achieve similar objectives.
2
Proposed rules would potentially change marketing practices, alter the information conveyed in
newspaper, radio or TV ads, and stretch the “free trial” periods before “early termination fees”
would kick-in.  (See Table 1.)  The effect on consumers of such measures has been analyzed in
previous work.
3  This paper discusses the policy arguments for determining such service rules
state-by-state versus the imposition of federal regulatory standards.
Portions of the question have been decided in favor of federal jurisdiction, while other
responsibilities are given to state law.  Cellular phone service fundamentally depends on
spectrum policies enacted by the federal government.  The basic market structure questions –
how many firms compete, what technologies they use, how much bandwidth they access, how
they interconnect with other networks – are consequently determined by the Federal
Communications Commission.  Moreover, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
established that “no State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or
the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service….”
4  This
effectively preempted state regulation of cellular rates with a one-year phase-in, meaning that
there has been no federal or state regulation of wireless telephone charges since August 1994.
                                                          
1 Jeffrey  Silva,  States Get Tougher on Wireless, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (Feb. 10, 2003), p. 1.
2  Schumer Unveils First Comprehensive Cell Phone User Bill of Rights, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer (Feb. 25,
2003),
 http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press_releases/PR01504.pfd.
3  Thomas W. Hazlett, Regulating Wireless Phones in California: An Economic Analysis, paper presented at
the Pacific Research Institute Conference, Regulating Wireless in California (San Francisco; April 15, 2003);
http://www.pacificresearch.org/events/2003/wireless/HazlettPaper.pdf.
4  47 U.S.C.S., sec. 332(c)(3)(A).  The language of this section has been taken by some to include federal
preemption of local zoning authority involving wireless base stations, towers, and antennas.  Office of Technology
Assessment, Wireless Technologies and the National Information Infrastructure, Government Printing Office #052-
003-01421-1 (Sept. 1995), p. 208.  In addition, federal law preempted states from levying property taxes on wireless
phone licenses (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, sec. 6002).2
In the 1993 federal preemption statute, however, states were left with jurisdiction over
“other terms and conditions.”
5  How much regulatory authority this cedes to the states is legally
uncertain.
6    In equilibrium, it appears clear that there will be some shared responsibilities, with
federal jurisdiction for key economic regulations including spectrum-related issues, and state
authority over matters that are traditionally decentralized, such as the resolution of contractual
disputes in municipal and state courts.
The question addressed in this paper is where, as a matter of public policy, to draw the
line regarding the consumer protection regulations now under consideration.   From the
perspective of consumer welfare, and assuming a possible role for regulatory standards, where –
in the several states or at the federal government level -- are such standards likely to be most
efficiently evaluated and applied?
                                                          
5  47 U.S.C.S., sec. 332(c)(3)(A).
6  For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of
the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal Regulatory Framework That Is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull
Strong,” 50 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL (May 1998), http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v50no3.html.3
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Two broad sets of marketplace evidence help to answer this question, and both suggest
that federal jurisdiction is relatively efficient.  The first concerns the efficiency of national scope
in wireless networks.  The economics of wireless telephony suggest that, no matter the
jurisdiction selected for rule making, diverse local rules will not effectively determine standards.
Rather, nationally integrated network operators will select conformity with those regulations that
best allow them to offer nationwide service.  This obviates potential advantages of customized
                                                          
7   A CPUC draft was issued July 24, 2003; http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/Industry/Telco/billofrights.htm.  This
draft revised and, in some cases, scaled back proposed regulations.  The issues are still under discussion.4
regimes and undermines incentives for efficient rules, as the effects of regulations enacted by
individual states spill over into other jurisdictions.  The second set of data is derived from a
natural experiment involving 1994 federal preemption of cellular rate regulation by the states.
State controls demonstrably failed to lower rates for customers.  Nonetheless, strenuous
arguments were made at the time by several state regulatory commissions that such controls were
efficient and should be permitted to continue. This directly speaks to the effectiveness of state
regulation of wireless telephone service.
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I sketch a very brief history of the wireless
telephone industry.  In Section III, I summarize the general arguments for and against federal
preemption in economic regulation.  This includes examples from other sectors where diverse
state rules are efficient, and from where uniform federal standards have proven efficient.  Section
IV investigates the economics of wireless telephone service, producing the key finding that
consolidation of an atomistic licensing grid through mergers and operating agreements has
produced efficient national networks.  This is the service that consumers have demonstrated a
keen interest in purchasing.  Section V discusses the importance of national network economies
in wireless in light of the trade-offs generally associated with regulatory federalism. Section VI
examines results from a natural experiment wherein state regulation of cellular telephone rates
was preempted in 1994.  Section VII concludes that the weight of the evidence argues in favor of
substantial federal preemption in wireless telephone regulation.
II. A Brief History of the Wireless Telephone Industry
A basic description of the wireless telephone industry will aid the discussion of
regulatory options.  Cellular phone service began with the issuance of two competing licenses,
mostly by lottery, in each of 306 Metropolitan Service Areas (MSAs), 1984-86, and in 428 Rural
Service Areas, 1988-89.
8  This was the result of a rule making process formally initiated by the
                                                          
8  See: Thomas W. Hazlett and Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from the Cellular
Telephone License Lotteries, SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL (January 1993), 425-35. Experimental licenses were
issued in Chicago and Washington, D.C., where commercial cellular services commenced in 1983.  Wireless
commercial phone service actually dates to 1946, but the high-power systems had very little capacity.  Cellular
employs much lower power, yielding re-use of frequencies from cell to cell, and hence provides the capacity for
much more traffic.  L. Keta Ruiz, Pricing Strategies and Regulatory Effects in the U.S. Cellular
Telecommunications Duopolies, in Gerald Brock, ed., Toward a Competitive Telecommunication Industry: Selected5
FCC in 1968.
9  The long delays involved regulatory debate over many issues, including how
many companies should be licensed and how much spectrum should be allocated for use.  The
FCC, on an assumption of natural monopoly, initially decided to license just one operator, but
became persuaded that some competition was possible, and that licensing two rivals in each
service area would still allow for economies of scale to be realized by each.  It allocated various
increments of bandwidth, finally deciding to allot 25 MHz (about the same used for four
television channels) to each license, with the frequencies to be in the UHF band reallocated from
TV channels 70-82.








Cellular A 1984-89 comparative
hearings,
lotteries
734 25 MHz 800 MHz
Cellular B 1984-89 comparative
hearings,
lotteries
734 25 MHz 800 MHz
PCS A 1995 auctions 51 30 MHz 1.9 GHz
PCS B 1995 auctions 51 30 MHz 1.9 GHz
PCS C 1996* auctions 493 30 MHz 1.9 GHz
PCS D 1997** auctions 493 10 MHz 1.9 GHz
PCS E 1997** auctions 493 10 MHz 1.9 GHz





  5 MHz
800 MHz
900 MHz
Totals n.a. n.a. 50,646 189 MHz n.a.
Source: http://wireless.fcc.gov/services and http://wireless.fcc.gov/ULS
* C Block PCS licenses were originally assigned in 1996 (with a few licenses reauctioned in 1999) but were the
subject of bankruptcy litigation until a Supreme Court ruling in late 2002.  About 80% of PCS-C licenses are
unutilized as of July 1, 2003.
** Portions of the D, E and F Blocks were reauctioned in 1999.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Papers from the 1994 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 13-46 (Hahway, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates; 1995), pp. 14-15.
9  Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter
of an Inquiry Relative to the Future use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz; and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21,
73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile Service Between 806 and 960 MHz, 14
FCC 2d 311 (1968).  See also First Report and Order and Second Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 18262 35 FED.
REG. 8644 (1970).   See also: G. Calhoun, Digital Cellular Radio (New York: Artech House, 1988).6
The potential of wireless telephone service was vastly underestimated. Through the 1980s
prices for cellular licenses, which were actively traded, increased almost monotonically.
Beginning trades were just $10 or $20 “per pop” (price of the license divided by total population
in the market area covered by the license), but by 1990 prices were in excess of $200.
10  By this
point, the aggregate nationwide value of the licenses just in the MSAs (covering about 80% of
U.S. population) was estimated at close to $80 billion by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
11
These large market capitalizations were driven by reinforcing trends within the sector, including:
•  Strong customer demand for wireless phone service.
•  Enhanced network coverage.
•  Rapidly falling handset costs.
•  Rapidly increasing handset functionality (including minitiaturization and increased
battery life).
Prices were much higher than fixed line service, however, and had exhibited no
substantial decline since the initiation of cellular systems.
12  The duopoly market structure
imposed on the industry had established reasonable service, but it was expensive and extremely
fragmented owing to the FCC’s 734-market licensing grid.  This was to change as competition
and consolidation dramatically restructured the industry.
Entry was primarily achieved in two regulatory proceedings, the most important being for
personal communications services (PCS).  PCS used smaller cells (than traditional cellular
systems) and digital formats that improved capacity and performance.  Formally initiated in
1990, the Commission allocated 120 MHz to six new licenses in the 1.9 GHz band.  Two
licenses (PCS-A and PCS-B) were allocated 30 MHz each, and issued in each of 51 Major
Trading Areas (MTAs).  These licenses were auctioned, pursuant to new federal legislation, in
1995.  Four remaining PCS licenses were assigned in each of 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs).
13
PCS-C was allocated 30 MHz, the rest (D, E, F) were allocated 10 MHz each.  Auctions for these
                                                          
10  Thomas W. Hazlett and Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone
License Lotteries, SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 59 (1993): 425-35.
11      U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S.
Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda for the Future, NTIA Special Publication 91-23 (Feb. 1991), p. D-5.
12  “There has been a rapid growth of cellular subscribers, due to reduction in equipment costs, even though
service prices have not fallen very much.”  Ruiz (1994), p. 15.
13 See,  generally,  http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions.7
licenses (C-F) were held in 1996 and 1997.
14   With simultaneous auctions, PCS bidders could
aggregate permits to create regional or national service territories, as Sprint PCS did, for
example, in winning licenses covering close to the entire country.
TABLE 3.  GROWTH IN U.S. WIRELESS TELEPHONE SERVICE, 1984–2002
Survey
Period
















1991 11,154,015,983 7,557,148 123 5,708,522 $0.51 2.9%
1992 13,567,533,156 11,032,753 102 7,822,726 $0.58 4.2%
1993 19,160,974,277 16,009,461 100 10,892,175 $0.57 6.1%
1994 26,950,000,239 24,134,421 93 14,229,922 $0.53 9.1%
1995 37,767,122,723 33,785,661 93 19,081,239 $0.51 12.6%
1996 51,970,200,176 44,042,992 98 23,634,971 $0.45 16.3%
1997 62,923,082,455 55,312,293 95 27,485,633 $0.44 20.2%
1998 89,010,438,637 69,209,321 107 33,133,175 $0.37 25.1%
1999 147,725,958,780 86,047,003 143 40,018,489 $0.27 30.9%
2000 258,754,859,127 109,478,031 197 52,466,020 $0.20 38.3%
2001 456,964,165,225 128,374,512 297 65,316,235 $0.14 44.4%
2002 619,000,000,000 140,766,842 366 76,508,187 $0.12 47.7%
Source: Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, WIRELESS INDUSTRY INDICES SEMIANNUAL DATA
SURVEY RESULTS (various issues).
PCS licensees began constructing competing wireless telephone systems just as Fleet
Call, now Nextel, was deploying a nationwide wireless network using Specialized Mobile Radio
(SMR) licenses.  The plan actually used licenses for local dispatch services (taxis, pizza delivery,
                                                          
14  Bankruptcy disputes arose with respect to many PCS-C licenses, and more than 80% of these licenses
(adjusted for population) were as yet undeployed as of July 1, 2003.  See:  Thomas W. Hazlett and Babette E.L.
Boliek, Use of Designated Entity Preferences in Assigning Wireless Licenses, 51 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW
JOURNAL  (May 1999), 639-63.  Carmen Nobel, Sitting Pretty at Last, eWEEK (June 2, 2003),
http://www.eweek.com/print_article/0,3668,a=42693,00.asp.8
etc.), which, by means of a strategic regulatory waiver, were permitted to provide wireless phone
competition.
15  By accumulating thousands of licenses for such localized services and creating a
national network with the right to offer service to the general public, a new coast-to-coast
wireless competitor was created.
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Source: By the Numbers, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, March 3, 2003, 8.
                                                          
15  The entrepreneurial vision driving Nextel was provided by a former FCC attorney, Morgan O’Brien.  See
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the
Punchline to Ronald Coase’s ‘Big Joke’: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &
TECHNOLOGY (2001) 335, pp. 426-428 http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/14HarvJLTech335.pdf.9
Ironically, just as entry was deconcentrating the industry, hundreds of mergers were
stitching together regional and national networks.  These reinforced the roaming agreements and
joint ventures that had been launched to create mobile services, giving customers the ability to
move with their telephones and yet receive cellular service through far-ranging local
connections.  The networks resulting from these combinations are listed in Table 4.
By 2001, when merger activity hit a lull
16, six national networks – AT&T Wireless,
Cingular (joint venture of SBC and BellSouth), Nextel, Sprint PCS, T-Mobile (Deutsche
Telekom), and Verizon Wireless – emerged dominant, accounting for about 85% of U.S.
subscribers.  But out of the consolidation arose competition, as no other country supports more
competing networks.  See Table 5.   This rivalry has resulted in a sharp decline in wireless
telephone charges, the average price per minute of use declining 79% between 1993 and 2002.
In response, the minutes of use has increased more than twenty-fold during this period.  See
Table 3.  Intense competitive pressure has made profits elusive, a situation investment analysts
describe as “profitless prosperity.”
17  But efficiency gains are apparent.
                                                          
16  Ironically, major merger activity in wireless ceased just as the FCC “spectrum cap” was relaxed.  The old
rule limited operators to licenses allocated no more than 45 MHz in any one market (with only small overlaps
exceeding this amount).  This prohibited the combination of a cellular license with a PCS A, B, or C license in any
given market (25 + 30 = 55 > 45).  The cap was relaxed, to 55 MHz, in 2001, and abolished in January 2003,
although federal antitrust scrutiny remains.  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of 2000 Biennial
Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT Docket No. 01-14,
Released December 18, 2001.  10
TABLE 5.  NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE NATIONAL WIRELESS NETWORKS





























Source:  OECD, as cited in Legg Mason Equity Research, What’s Next for Wireless: A Roadmap for Wireless
Investors (Jan. 2001), p. 30.
III. Regulation and the Trade-offs of State vs. Federal Jurisdiction
Economic Regulation
Government regulation provides two possible forms of protection for consumers, both
related to the concept of market failure.
18  The first is to constrain monopoly pricing, countering
inefficient distortions from competitive outcomes.  When successful, regulation can lower prices
and increase output.  This increases social welfare by producing greater value for a given
complement of labor and capital.
The second general aim of economic regulation is to remedy externality problems.  These
develop when costs or benefits do not accrue to the decision-makers who cause them and are,
hence, external to economic calculations.  This results in a range of misallocations, including
pollution (when costs are freely imposed on third parties) and the public good problem.  This
latter situation develops when certain actions that would create total benefits exceeding total
costs fail to be supplied because pay-offs cannot be captured by those who would shoulder the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
17  S. Flannery et al., Wireline Telecom Services: 3Q02 Preview, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter (Oct. 16,
2002), p. 27.
18  The classic analysis of market failure appears in Francis Bator, Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 QUARTERLY
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 351-79  (1958).11
costs of provision.  Free rider problems deny consumers useful products.  National defense,
pollution abatement, and creative works of art are valuable services that would presumably be
under-produced without government policies (including subsidies and intellectual property
rights) to offset free rider effects.
Regulation, of course, is neither free nor perfect.  Policy solutions must be advanced not
simply on grounds of market failure, which – when used as sole justification – asserts a deux ex
machina.  Market failure is necessary in an argument for government regulation, but is
insufficient without a convincing case that regulation will itself produce net consumer benefits.
19
Even when market failure has been addressed by, for instance, rate regulation of monopoly cable
television systems, policy remedies can prove counter-productive.
20  The case for regulation
fundamentally depends on the likelihood of increased consumer welfare.
Market power is not a compelling rationale for wireless telephone regulation.  Cellular
telephone markets were dominated by duopoly licensees, and market power clearly existed.
21
But with the emergence of personal communications service and ESMR (enhanced specialized
mobile radio) competition, and the emergence of six strong national networks, which
aggressively rival each other,
22 government regulators have declared the market to be highly
competitive.  In abolishing the “spectrum cap,” effective January 2003, federal regulators
certified that market rivalry was effectively protecting consumers from excessive prices.
23
The case for efficient government regulation in wireless must point to market failure in
the supply of consumer information.  Consumers make choices based on their preferences and
what they expect a given product will deliver.  The data on which purchasing decisions are based
flows from a variety of sources, including experience and research by the consumer, marketing
campaigns waged by sellers, reputational capital of sellers, publicity and product evaluations
provided by news organizations and third parties, and word of mouth.
                                                          
19 Charles  Wolf,  Jr.,  A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 JOURNAL
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 107-139 (1979).
20  Thomas W. Hazlett and Matthew L. Spitzer, Public Policy Towards Cable Television: The Economics of
Rate Controls (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 208-12.
21  Thomas W. Hazlett, Market Power in the Cellular Telephone Duopoly, paper submitted to the Federal
Communications on Behalf of Time Warner Telecommunications (Aug. 1993).
22  The six networks are:  AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, Cingular, Sprint PCS, Nextel, and T-Mobile.
23  “Various economic indicators confirm the presence of meaningful economic competition in markets for
CMRS.”  Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum
Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT Docket No. 01-14, Released December 18, 2001.12
In some instances, however, reliable information is under-provided because suppliers are
not remunerated for supplying it.  Alternative market mechanisms for discovering which
products best satisfy preferences are available, but may leave a gap unfilled.  Then the rationale
for government regulation is to encourage the supply of valuable information consumers would
gladly pay the market cost of providing.
24
One particularly important rationale for government regulation arises under the
externality rubric in the context of “fly by night” operations.  When firms supply goods without
sinking capital, they may be tempted to cheat on performance.  This behavior may include
misleading advertising, hidden charges, or the delivery of goods or services much less valuable
than anticipated by the customer.
25    In advantageous circumstances for such supply-side
opportunism, cheating vendors may be able to escape with profits as consumers have difficulty
in identifying such behavior pre-purchase.  A legal intervention to improve quality
ascertainment, perhaps through direct regulation or via bonding rules (in essence, forcing firms
to commit irreversible investment capital), may improve efficiency.
In wireless telephone service, opportunism is relevant to the regulatory discussion in an
interesting way.  Wireless network owners commit very substantial resources to establishing
infrastructure; these assets will only prove profitable where long-run economic viability is
maintained.  These sellers are unlikely to ‘fly by night,’ leaving enormous capital assets
behind.
26  This makes the argument for regulatory intervention weaker than in services where
market forces do not similarly punish opportunistic behavior by sellers.  Yet, this is where the
debate over new rules for wireless is occurring.  This paper, however, is not concerned with the
substantive merits of the arguments for regulation, but with the question of optimal jurisdiction.
                                                          
24  On the arguments for economic regulation, see W. Kip Viscusi, et al., Economics of Regulation and
Antitrust, 3
rd Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
25  Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 89 (August 1981): 615-41.
26  The possibility that a network service provider could exit the retail market and yet use their nonsalvageable
capital to provide wholesale services to resellers means that infrastructure investments may not be totally sunk.
Yet, the gap in value between a network that integrates retail services and one that relies exclusively on resellers is
likely substantial.  (This is implied by the observation that no successful U.S. wireless network executes this
business model.)  Hence, the capital value at stake in preserving a reputation in the market for retail services is also
likely to be substantial.13
The Federalism Debate
Federalism is a system wherein governmental responsibilities occur at multiple levels,
with power not being entirely centralized or decentralized.  The United States is perceived as a
federalist experiment due to its relatively heavy use of overlapping jurisdictions, from mosquito
abatement districts to the U.S. Government.  The European Union has centralized some
important rule making authority to regulate economic activity in sovereign states, making it a
federalist experiment of a different character.
Federalism has been described as a balancing act, “the approach to governance that seeks
to combine unity and diversity.”
27 The compromise prompts heated debates over where to
allocate authority for specific policies.  Two famous positions were staked out by Supreme Court
Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Justice Brandeis celebrated the diversity of
state jurisdiction:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
28
The reverse angle was captured by Justice Holmes, however, who focused on the
importance of rationalizing disparate regulations under unified national law:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void.  I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.  For one in my
place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained to
national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce
Clause was meant to end.
29
Across the globe such arguments rage.  The formation of the European Union and the
restructuring of post-Communist governments have generated heated debate on the extent of
                                                          
27 John  Kincaid,  Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism, 25 PUBLIUS (Spring 1995) 29-44, p. 30.
28  This passage is from the dissent filed by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311.  This 1932 case concerned an Oklahoma law licensing ice distributors.  Brandeis thought it best to let
Oklahoma experiment with a rule that restricted competition, but the majority overturned it as economic regulation
violating the 14
th Amendment’s equal protection clause.  See: Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy:
Anatomy of a Metaphor, AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK (2001); http://www.federalismproject.org/outlook/5-2001.html.
29  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 296 (1920).  This passage is
cited in Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal
Regulatory Framework That Is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong,” 50 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW
JOURNAL (May 1998), http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v50no3.html.14
local versus national, or international, authority.
30  Decentralization in legal authority is
beneficial because it allows diverse rules to spring up, be tested, and adopted according to what
appears to work best.  Uniformity in rules, on the other hand, offers the efficiencies of
standardization.
Economist Barry Weingast writes that, “For most of the last 300 years, the richest nation
in the world has had a federal structure: the Netherlands from the late 16
th through mid-17
th
century, England from the late 17
th or early 18
th through the mid-19
th century, and the United
States from the late 19
th century until the late 20
th century.”
31  Weingast argues that the well-
developed federal systems found in these economies helped limit politicization of market
transactions, spurring wealth creation.
32  Historian Paul Johnson finds that America has far more
political jurisdictions than any other country in the world, and sees this governmental diversity as
important in understanding both the political and economic success of the United States.
33
On the other hand, eliminating state-level trade barriers via federal preemption can create
a productive ‘common market’ erasing impediments to efficiency.  Constitutional scholar
Archibald Cox cites Ogden v. Gibbons (1824) as one of the most important Supreme Court
decisions in U.S. history.
34   By striking down a New York law monopolizing steamship routes
within the state, the Court protected interstate commerce.  The Court’s decision preempted state
regulations that would “hamper the development of one great continentwide, free-trade market,”
a fundamental condition for America’s economic success.
35  "Commerce among the states,"
Chief Justice John Marshall declared, "cannot stop at the external boundary of each State, but
may be extended into the interior."
36 Weingast’s “market-preserving federalism” carefully
includes the caveat that local jurisdictions need be constrained by a “common market…
                                                          
30  “The European Union… reflects emerging governance issues in a world in which people and places have
become closely connected by technology, and in which individuals have been made more mobile by that technology,
both physically and electronically.  The need for international governance arrangements has become more apparent,
even while pressures for local self-government by discrete peoples in distinct places have become more strident.
Hence, there is the seeming paradox of global integration and regional fragmentation occurring simultaneously…”
John Kincaid, Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism, 25 PUBLIUS 29-44 (Spring 1995), pp. 29-30.
31 Barry  Weingast,  The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic
Development, 7 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION 1-30 (1995), p. 3.
32  See also, Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
416 (1956).
33  Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York; Harper Collins, 1997).
34  Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), pp. 84-89.
35 Ibid.,  p.  85.
36 Ibid.,  p.  86.15
preventing the lower governments from using their regulatory authority to erect trade
barriers…”
37
State vs. Federal Jurisdiction
The question of optimal jurisdiction commonly arises in the United States when
overlapping regulatory interests are present, as in antitrust law,
38 cable television regulation,
39
food labeling,
40 as well as in wireless telephony.  State regulation is typically better able to
regulate when local markets are relatively idiosyncratic, when the benefits of diverse rules are
large relative to the costs of non-uniformity, when the rules adopted in one state are largely
contained within that jurisdiction, and when state utility commissions (or local franchising
agents) are as technically competent as federal regulators.
41  Local utilities have traditionally
been regulated as monopoly franchises by state commissions, to give one set of examples.
The advantage of differentiation lies in the informational efficiencies local regulators
enjoy relative to the advantages of scale economies they sacrifice (or disrupt).  Diverse state
rules allow for trial and error, allowing different approaches to be tested over time.  Yet,
conflicting rules and regulations can clog the wheels of commerce, introducing inefficiencies
that lower consumer welfare.
The economic analysis of federalism is summarized in a 1997 article in the JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES:
Tiebout (1956) presented the first systematic argument as to how a decentralized
federal structure could be used to achieve economic efficiency in the provision of
public services… In the Tiebout economy, most public services are assumed to be
                                                          
37  Weingast (1995), p. 4.   Similarly, in outlining the theoretical case for federalism, economist James
Buchanan notes that in “a genuinely competitive federalism… the central or federal government would be
constitutionally restricted in its domain… Within its assigned sphere, however, the central government would be
strong, sufficiently so to allow it to enforce economic freedom or openness over the whole of the territory.  The
separate states would be prevented, by federal authority, from placing barriers on the free-flow of resources and
goods across their borders.”  James M. Buchanan, Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for
Constitutional Reform, 25 PUBLIUS (Spring 1995) 19-17, p. 21.
38  Robert H. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 02-9 (Sept. 2002); forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY.
39 Thomas  W.  Hazlett,  Cable Television Rate Deregulation, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMICS OF
BUSINESS 3 (No. 2, 1996), 145-63.
40  Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Effect of the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 Food & Drug Law Journal 649-674 (1994).
41  The issue of whether state or local regulators are more prone to capture by competing interests is also
discussed in the literature.  See Hahn and Layne-Farrar, supra note 39.  This question is not addressed here.16
congestible and efficiently provided by small communities.  Thus, lower-tier
governments are given significant policy responsibilities.  Households are
assumed to be freely mobile; they shop among local jurisdictions for that
community which offers their preferred package of services, taxes, and
regulations… It is this variety and the pressure it imposes on the unfavored
communities and states which Justice Brandeis most likely had in mind when
advocating local and state governments as “laboratories” for the design of public
policies.  However, when there are significant intercommunity interdependencies
(like pure public goods or spillovers), Tiebout’s competition among small
governments may result in economically inefficient public policies.  Potential
examples of such inefficiencies include…. regulation (Oates and Schwab,
1986)…
42
When economic realities dictate that production of goods is efficiently done across
jurisdictions (i.e., economies of scale stretch beyond state borders), decentralized regulations
lack effective feedback. State regulators have little direct information regarding costs imposed on
consumers in other states, and have little reason to acquire it.  Even assuming that state
regulators are well-informed as to costs and benefits within their political jurisdiction, an
important externality issue is introduced courtesy of economies of scale (including network
effects).  As two economists have recently written about state-level antitrust policy, “state
officials do not face appropriate incentives to represent U.S. consumer interests in an antitrust
case that could have national… ramifications.”
43  On the same topic, Judge Richard Posner
argues that the effect of state antitrust authorities joining cases with nationwide implications is to
                                                          
42  Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 45-64 (Fall 1997), at 46 (footnotes omitted).  The passage cites the work of Wallace Oates and
Robert Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing? 35
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1986), 333-354.  In another paper, Inman and Rubinfeld elaborate on economic
research related to public finance:  “… the current empirical evidence suggests competitive local governments can
provide an efficient level of congestible (local) public goods… What is not assured is the efficient allocation of
public goods with significant spillovers… [a] policy to control interjurisdictional spillovers would require the
agreement of the competitive city-states.  For such agreements we must look to more encompassing political
institutions.”  Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in Dennis C.
Mueller, ed., PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), 73-105, at 85-86.
43  Hahn and Layne-Farrar (2002), p. 5.  For a somewhat different view, see Paul Teske, The Role of State
Institutions in Mediating Interest Group Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Third Annual State Politics Conference,
Tucson, Arizona (March 14, 2003).17
“lengthen out the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify and protract the uncertainty
engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.”
44
Law professor Michael McConnell writes that “Externalities present the principal
countervailing consideration in favor of centralized government…”
45  This creates a mis-match
between the costs and benefits considered in decision making by smaller units of government.
Importantly, it occurs not just when property rights are ill-defined (the Coasian sense of
“externality”
46) but when economies of scale extend across states.  Then the highly
complementary nature of supplying consumers in multiple political jurisdictions produces costs
and benefits which may largely escape notice by regulatory authorities.
The key economic issue concerns the costs and benefits of rule-diversity.  While
consumers may have heterogeneous interests that return some informational advantage to state
jurisdictions, the lack of coordination with other states can create costs for local consumers that
outweigh these advantages.  Costs rise when economies of scale are important, as is clearly the
case with nationally-distributed products.  The following analysis discusses preemption issues
regarding regulation of nutritional labeling:
In determining when [federal] preemption might be necessary, Professor Susan
Bartlett Foote noted that "in essence, regulations adopted by individual states are
inappropriate when they impose costs on manufacturers by interfering with
economies of scale that would otherwise be available in the production of
nationally distributed goods."  Foote cites state labeling and packaging
requirements as examples of state laws that might in some circumstances
sufficiently impede the flow of interstate commerce to justify federal
preemption.
47
                                                          
44  Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 3 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 925 (2001), p. 940.
45 Michael  W.  McConnell,  Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
REVIEW 1484-1512 (1987), p. 1495.
46 Ronald  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1-40 (1960).
47   David F.  Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law:  Eliminating the “Gray”
Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 991-1027 (July, 1993), p. 1005.  Welsh provides an interesting
overview of the question of regulatory preemption generally.  “There is no clear-cut policy pronouncement
concerning when or why Congress preempts. However, a predominant function of preemption is to invalidate state
laws that frustrate the development of necessary, uniform federal laws. Additionally, preemption often acts as a
means of stopping states from interfering with the free flow of goods across state lines. In both of these cases,
preemption is used to stop states from fractionalizing the country in pursuit of independent, local commercial
concerns. As the Supreme Court clearly stated, ‘a central concern of the Framers ... was that in order to succeed, the
new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations ... among18
Efficient Federal Preemption
Selection of the optimal jurisdiction largely reduces to a search for the smallest unit of
government (lowest tier) that substantially avoids beggar thy neighbor outcomes from
decentralized policy making.  These result when non-uniformity is relatively costly, and when
the advantages of diverse rules are relatively unimportant.  Under such circumstances, several
problems can develop with decentralization, most of which are associated with free riding.
In public finance, one example involves funding of such public goods as national
defense.  Low taxes being in the interests of elected state or local officials, decentralized
provision would be predicted to lead to under provision.  National defense is most efficiently
provided at the national level in that exclusion of non-payers is difficult.  Local or state officials
predictably have incentives to limit taxes in their jurisdiction by free riding on the burdens
shouldered elsewhere, a paradigmatic example of a governmental function most efficiently
supplied through the central authority.
Ronald McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba develop this idea into a general theory of
jurisdiction choice.
Economic theory suggests that the appropriate level of government to provide a
given public good critically depends on the degree of spatial nonrivalry of that
good.  Imagine, for example, the (admittedly absurd) proposition that school
districts should provide their own deterrents against external threats.  This would
require substantial duplication of investment in nuclear arsenals when the same
objective could be met at a significantly lower (per person) cost by the central
government (since the same nuclear arsenal can protect both Los Angeles and
New York).  The national nonrivalry embodied in national public goods thus
gives rise to large cost advantages to central governments whose constituents are
numerous because the total expense of providing the good is independent of the
size of the population… At the same time, there is no such cost advantage to
having the central government provide such goods as local neighborhood parks
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”  Ibid., p.1014, citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26
(1979).19
because the nonrivalry of these goods only extends over a small geographic
area.
48
McKinnon and Nechyba lay out a grid for analyzing governmental functions, partially
summarized in Table 6.  The general argument for centralization in policy making is economic
efficiency.  It is important to note that the “spatial nonrivalry” aspect of national defense extends
to other domains.  While not perfectly ‘nonrivalrous,’ network industries that depend on national
economies of scale exhibit similar economic characteristics.
49   Ferejohn and Weingast
summarize this point:
Economists conclude that deciding on the best jurisdiction to provide a particular
service depends on the characteristics of that service.  If a given amount of the
service can be provided more cheaply when it is produced for many rather than
few citizens (national defense), if the benefits of the service extend over a large
geographic area (certain types of pollution control), or if decentralization would
lead to “bad” competition among the states or inequitable outcomes across the
states, these services should be provided by the national government.
                                                          
48  Ronald McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems, in John Ferejohn and Barry R.
Weingast, eds., The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press; 1997) 3-61,
pp. 6-7.
49  As an empirical matter, federal preemption is often applied to network industries.  “All authority to engage
in economic regulation of airline, bus, and trucking companies has been removed from states… States, however, are
authorized to conduct inspections utilizing national standards relative to grain quality and weighing, hazardous and
solid waste materials, railroad safety, and certain types of ionizing radiation.” Joseph F. Zimmerman, Preemption in
the U.S. Federal System, 23 PUBLIUS (Fall 1993) 1-13, p. 6.20
TABLE 6.  EXTERNALITIES PRODUCING “CENTRALIZING FORCES” IN THE
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“Race to the bottom”
Zoning for high-smokestack
industries
Source: McKinnon and Nechyba (1997), Table 1, p. 14.
In markets where economies of scale or scope are important, it is possible for
decentralized policy makers to effectively free ride on investments undertaken by consumers in
other jurisdictions.  This occurs when a system is built to serve a large regional or national
market, and state or local policy makers impose expensive regulations over a subset of that
system.  These regulations impose a tax, which may or may not be efficient for local consumers
(meaning that benefits accruing to local customers may or may not exceed the costs they pay).
For consumers in other jurisdictions, the costs and benefits are likely to be dissimilar.  The
important issue for considering optimal jurisdiction is that with decentralized authority there will
be important implications for consumers in other jurisdictions, and that these costs and benefits
are not likely to be accounted for by policy makers.   Analogous to a ‘race to the bottom,’ state
regulators search for rules that will bestow benefits locally while shifting costs to network
investments that enable local benefits to be subsidized by users elsewhere.
Suppose a rule is imposed by Idaho regulators mandating that wireless carriers send each
Idaho subscriber a monthly statement comparing the customer’s billing with what identical
service would cost on five other carriers.  This “full disclosure” act, let’s assume, costs $10 per
subscriber per month.  Assume that the benefit to customers, however, is just $0.50 per month
(meaning that each subscriber would agree to pay just $6.00 per year to receive such a
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statement).  The rule is highly inefficient, imposing costs twenty times the level of benefits.
But state regulators may still impose the rule, even under the assumption that Idaho regulators
are perfectly loyal to the interests of Idaho residents.
If wireless telephone service is efficiently provided by national networks (as opposed to
local systems), and if providing those networks entails the use of standardized national calling
plans, then customizing a separate pricing structure for Idaho customers may prove more trouble
than its worth for wireless carriers.  Carriers would then provide the monthly statements to Idaho
subscribers without a differential charge; competition would drive these costs to customers in
other states.  The charges would be imperceptible to users in Idaho (or elsewhere).  But the
incentives thereby created would lead to regulatory free riding across all states, and costs would
accumulate.
Three outcomes would result.  First, inefficiency would obtain in regulatory rules that
imposed costs in excess of the benefits delivered.  Second, the decline in network profitability
(associated with the inefficiency of the regulations imposed in Idaho) would lower investment in
network infrastructure nationally.  The magnitude could be modest, but the direction of change is
unambiguous: with higher costs, the value of acquiring subscribers is lower.
50  Third, state
regulators elsewhere would be tempted to do what Idaho regulators have done, pursuing ways to
impose costs that benefit in-state subscribers but impose costs nationwide.  Competition can
yield a ‘race for the top’ when each state takes account of the total effect of its actions; here it
yields a ‘race for the bottom’ as each state attempts to free ride.  The optimal political solution in
this environment is to pursue the greatest cross-subsidy, thereby eliminating regulatory
rationality.
Even with a best-case scenario, inefficiencies arise when the costs imposed on wireless
users by regulators in one state spillover to subscribers elsewhere.  This would be the case where
national network operators chose to comply with the most restrictive rules, a common result
when diverse rules are imposed and where services offered in one jurisdiction are highly
complementary with services provided elsewhere.  This latter condition often obtains with
economies of scale in production, or networks which become more valuable to customers as their
                                                          
50  The increase in costs is not offset by higher demand, and hence higher prices, for two reasons.  First,
national pricing is efficient, and the great majority of customers do not receive any benefit from the costs imposed in
Idaho.  Second, Idaho customers are not willing to pay as much as the regulations cost, such that increased demand
would not entirely offset the higher costs even if optimally configured networks served Idaho alone.22
geographic scope expands.  In food labeling, for instance, states applied diverse regulations prior
to federal harmonization under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA).
One study notes, “Because food manufacturers selling to a nationwide market cannot afford to
tailor advertising and labeling for particular states, they usually conform with the most restrictive
applicable law.”
51
The problem is not that ripple effects occur, but that state regulators have no reason to
take into account what ripples across state borders.  States can “over-consume” regulation by
dumping costs on others, or “under-consume” because benefits are too widely distributed.  As a
general rule, the lowest level of government that can accurately determine costs and benefits is
the jurisdiction logically selected to make regulatory decisions:  “Economic federalism prefers
the most decentralized structure of government capable of internalizing all economic
externalities…”
52
Economic externalities imply that state decision making is ineffective.  That is because
firms adjust to diverse regulations by conforming to those rules that allow for the best aggregate
operations.  When integrated national networks are key both to suppliers, who seek scale
economies, and to consumers, who desire nationwide coverage, the competition between the
states results not in diverse standards but ‘winner take all’ -- the ‘winner’ being the state with the
most restrictive regulations.  In situations where state regulations contradict each other, even this
effort to smooth out differences in state laws will be stymied, and the costs of balkanization
further increased.
Examples of Competition and Preemption
Corporation Charters
States compete in the provision of corporate charters.  These establish default rules for
corporate procedures, governing the relationship between firm shareholders, bondholders, and
managers.  The rules laid down in state charters can be changed according to the preferences of
companies, but the procedures whereby such reforms are enacted take place under the corporate
                                                          
51  Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Effect of the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG LAW JOURNAL 649-74 (1994), pp. 653-654.
52  Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 45-64 (Fall 1997), p. 45.23
law in effect.   In addition, legal enforcement of corporate by-laws is provided in state courts
under the precedents established in that state.  Hence, the standard charter set forth in law is
likely to have the clearest set of precedents to guide corporate decision makers.
Perhaps the best known aspect of the state charter competition is that Delaware is the
acknowledged leader.  “[A]pproximately half of the largest corporations are incorporated in
Delaware, and the overwhelming majority of firms changing their state of incorporation move to
Delaware.”
53  The state funds over twenty percent of its state budget via fees assessed on each
share of stock in firms incorporated there.
54  It has achieved this success by offering both a
standard framework, and a legal system (and voluminous corporate case law), offering incentives
for firms to “locate” their legal residence in Delaware.  This is a virtual geographic choice, of
course, as incorporation is a legal transaction divorced from where a firm operates physical
facilities.
Scholars have taken both sides of the federalism debate with respect to corporate charters.
But Roberta Romano concludes that, “The best available evidence indicates that, for the most
part, the race is for the top and not the bottom in the production of corporate laws.”
55  The
outcome of a competition between the states has been “innovative corporate codes that quickly
respond to changing market conditions and firm demands.”
56  Both efficient and inefficient laws
have been passed, but states have often been forced to mimic the efficient statutes, and to
abandon the inefficient.  Moreover, the lack of choice present in centralized systems does not
provide advantages.  “[T]he EU harmonization project for corporate laws found that European
nations have a panoply of restrictive provisions long eliminated from U.S codes as unwieldy and
unprofitable.”
57
A key economic aspect of the market for corporate codes is the extreme mobility of
resources.  Firm operations have no physical connection to firm incorporation.  This allows
markets to react to state laws without evident externalities.
                                                          
53 Roberta  Romano,  State Competition for Corporate Charters, in John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, eds.,
The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997) 129-54, p. 131.
54 Ibid.,  p.  132.
55 Ibid.,  p.  149.
56 Ibid.
57  Ibid., citing William J. Carney, Federal and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the Results of
Competition, in Joeseph McCahery, William W. Bratton, Sol Picciotto, and Colin Scott, eds., International
Regulation Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1996).24
Food Labeling
In the late 1980s, 20 state legislatures considered widely varying bills regulating nutrition
labeling.  This prompted federal preemption in the Food Labeling Act of 1990.  Food
manufacturers lobbied for the measure, fearing costly mandates prompted by fifty different
standards.
58  The Food and Drug Administration, the George H.W. Bush administration, and the
states originally opposed preemption.  Crafting broad rules that garnered general agreement,
however, reduced opposition, and the advantages of uniformity tipped the scales in favor of
national standards.
59
Economies of national distribution scale again drove the decision.  Consumers are
directly and indirectly benefited by having standards applied consistently across states.  Direct
benefits flow from reducing information costs, as consumers familiarize themselves with the
same labels no matter where they might purchase products or where the products might be
manufactured.  Indirectly, as manufacturers realize production efficiencies, lower prices result.
This is true in competitive markets and even in monopolistic markets where incremental costs
are reduced.
60
The costs associated with state regulation include a reduction in the rate of market
innovation.  In dynamic markets where new products, service packages, or marketing structures
are rapidly evolving, this may be a very high price.  Fifty distinct regulatory regimes yield
incentives for nationally-integrated suppliers to avoid regional variations in their products by
providing a least-common-denominator output.  Product differentiation may not only be costly
due to sacrificed scale economies, but incurs state regulatory monitoring costs.  Hence, the irony
is that experimentation by state regulators may reduce experimentation by firms.  In food
                                                          
58  David Greenberg and Mary Graham, Improving Communication About New Food Technologies, ISSUES IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Summer 2000, 42-48.
59  “Opposition to preemption was based in large part on the fear that if states were preempted from enforcing
their own labeling laws, consumers would be left with a weak federal law and lax federal enforcement.  The
[National Labeling and Education Act’s] structure of tough standards combined with state enforcement authority
quelled these fears and led the FDA, White House, food industry, and state AGs’ general support of the NLEA’s
preemption provision.”   Bradley (1994), p. 658.
60  “Inconsistent labeling laws can slow food manufacturing and distribution, raise prices, and confuse
consumers confronted with different information warnings.  Because food manufacturers selling to a nationwide
market cannot afford to tailor advertising and labeling for particular states, they usually conform with the most
restrictive applicable law.”  Bradley (1994), pp. 653-654.25
labeling, “[S]ome companies commented that… States having unique requirements impeded the
development of new foods.”
61
Federal preemption for conflicting rules occurred in the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990 (NLEA).  This left states with a regulatory role, particularly in enforcement.  Both
government and industry have found that the uniformity created by federal preemption was
beneficial.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that consumer awareness of the
ingredients in food, the purpose of food labeling regulations, advanced after enactment of federal
rules:
The Health and Diet Surveys that are conducted every five years are the most
effective means of measuring the effectiveness of educational interventions in
promoting the use of food labels. In FY 90, the Health and Diet Survey (pre-
NLEA) found that 30% of adults used the food labels to make a decision on the
purchase or use of food products. Data from the 1995 survey disclosed that 48%
of people age 18 and older reported changing their decision to buy or use a food
product because they read the food label.
62
           Food  industry  sources,  while  critical of many aspects of federal regulatory policy,
continue to endorse the efficiency of federal preemption.  In fact, a key goal of producers is to
extend regulatory uniformity in other state laws regulating food.   An executive with the Grocery
Manufacturers’ Association (GMA) recently testified as follows:
The Continuing Need for National Uniformity in Food Regulation.  The
NLEA advanced toward the important goal of national uniformity in food
regulation. NLEA provided national uniformity for most aspects of food labeling.
It failed, however, to include national uniformity for food warnings or for food
safety. GMA believes that, in order to have a comprehensive and integrated
national system of food protection, enactment of national uniformity legislation is
essential.
                                                          
61  Donna V. Porter and Robert O. Earl, eds., Food Labeling: Toward National Uniformity (Institute of
Medicine, 1992), p. 155; http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309047374/html.
62  Food Safety Research Information Office (FSRIO), FDA FY 2001 Performance Plan (Feb. 15, 2001),
http://www.nal.usda.gov/fsrio/ppd/fda05.htm.   FSRIO is an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.26
Our nation-wide economy cannot support fifty differing state laws and regulations
governing the food supply. Interstate commerce throughout the wide reaches of
our country requires a consistent, uniform, and predictable system of laws and
regulations that permit transport of food under a single set of regulatory standards.
GMA has actively sought both administrative and statutory adoption of national
uniformity in food labeling for the past several years, and will continue to seek
this objective until it is ultimately achieved.
63
Trucking
While a court ruling preempted state regulation of interstate trucking in the 1920s, state
regulation was still permitted over intrastate services.
 64  States filled this niche.
 65  By the early
1990s, however, eight states had deregulated intrastate trucking, while “Other states have various
restrictions, some quite onerous.”
66  Thomas Gale Moore estimated that state controls were costing
between $5 billion and $12 billion annually.
67
State level regulation had long proven a menace to the economic welfare of shippers.  In
particular, state rules unfairly benefited railroads.  By lobbying for rules such as weight limits on
trucking shipments (often imposed as safety measures) that differed from state to state, they could
disrupt the emergence of rival networks.  Economist George Stigler thought it provocative that
“Texas and Louisiana placed a 7000-pound payload limit on trucks serving (and hence competing
with) two or more railroad stations, and a 14,000-pound limit on trucks serving only one station
(hence, not competing with it).”
68
But the primary liability of state regulation was the inherent inconsistency of disparate rules
dotting regional or national truck routes.  In a recent brief to the United States Supreme Court, the
American Trucking Association explained that, “Inevitably, the resulting patchwork of state
regulations… interfered with the standardization of vehicles and wreaked havoc on the burgeoning
                                                          
63  Testimony of Lisa Katic, Senior Food & Health Policy Advisor, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.
GMA NEWS (May 3, 2001),
http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/testimony.cfm?DocID=747 (emphasis in original).
64  Thomas Gale Moore, Unfinished Business in Motor Carrier Deregulation, 14 REGULATION 3 (1991).
Available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv14n3/reg14n3-moore.html.
65  John C. Taylor, Regulation of the Trucking Industry by the States, 17 REGULATION (1994).
66 Moore  (1991).
67 Ibid.
68 George  Stigler,  The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE 3-21 (1971), p. 8.27
motor carrier industry.”
69  It goes on to cite the analysis of Ohio State University history professor
William R. Childs:
If a trucker began a trip in Chicago, heading east, he could load a truck and trailer
with a total of 39,000 pounds, 20,000 on the truck and 19,000 in the trailer.  When
he approached the Indiana border, he had to remove 16,000 pounds from the truck
and 12,800 pounds from the trailer to meet the Hoosier State’s limit of 10,200
pounds.  Once in Ohio he could add a total of 7,000 pounds; Pennsylvania
allowed an additional 14,000 pounds (to total 31,200).
In addition to the weight restrictions, states imposed different limits on the height,
length, and width of commercial vehicles… Local, state, and interstate truckers
suffered from increased operating costs, while [truck] manufacturers faced diverse
production requirements…
70
The history of trucking regulation involves a long march to federal preemption.  For decades,
federal courts over-ruled state trucking regulations, on the grounds that “it is well settled that a state
has no power to fetter the right to carry on interstate commerce within its borders by the imposition
of conditions or regulations which are unnecessary and pass beyond the bounds of what is
reasonable…”
71  State commissions, however, continued to impose rules by interpreting federal
decisions narrowly, setting up a running controversy over appropriate regulatory jurisdiction.  Some
of this was resolved by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which shifted intrastate rate-setting authority
to the Interstate Commerce Commission.  Yet, states continued to attempt to impose their own rules,
and not all were immediately struck down by federal courts.
72 “This continuing parochialism…
wreaked on interstate commerce,”
73 and fueled demand for harmonization even after federal trucking
deregulation was enacted in 1980.
74
                                                          
69  Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Trucking Association, in City of Columbus, Mitchell Brown, and
Bobbie Beavers v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., and the Towing and Recovery Association of Ohio, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 01-419 (March 2002), p. 6.
70  William R. Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest: The Emergence of Federal Regulation 1914-1940
(1985), as quoted in the American Trucking Association (2002), op cit., p. 7.
71  Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925), p. 577.
72  Although many were.  See: Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc., v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
73  American Trucking Association (2002), p. 13.
74  Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.28
Further federal preemption was achieved in 1994 as part of a bill to generally deregulate
transportation carriers, and was specifically aimed at improving intermodal competition.
75
Effective Jan. 1, 1995, economic regulation of intrastate trucking was preempted by federal law.
This left states able to regulate very limited aspects of trucking, including safety.  But when, for
example, municipalities attempted to license tow truck operators, their regulatory efforts were
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002.
76  The Federal Trade Commission produced a
study in 1994 that found that state regulation of trucking raised shipping costs 32% to 37%.
77
The federal preemption is conservatively estimated to result in efficiency gains of $4-8 billion
annually.
78
The rationale for federal preemption in trucking has direct application to the wireless
telephone preemption question.  Trucking is a network industry, and rules imposed by individual
states may have national consequences:
According to the Conference Committee report, Section 601 of the FAA
Authorization Act was intended to preempt a “patchwork” of intrastate motor
carrier regulations in 41 states that placed intolerable burdens on interstate
commerce by causing “significant inefficiencies, increased costs, reduction of
competition, inhibition of innovation and technology and curtailing the expansion
of markets.”
79
Many trucking interests supported harmonization of rules which would be achieved via
federal preemption.  “Consider, for example, the situation of a nationwide motor carrier that
conducts operations in communities throughout the country.  Even if state and local regulations
never came into direct conflict with one another… for such a carrier to keep current on all of the
individual municipal ordinances applicable to its trucking operations would be a Herculean
task.”
80
                                                          
75  The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 preempted states from regulating the rates
or services of motor carriers.
76  City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Svc., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002).
77  As cited in Paul Teske, Samuel Best, and Michael Mintrom, Deregulating Freight Transportation:
Delivering the Goods (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press; Jan. 1997), p. 143.
78  Teske, Best, and Mintrom (1997), Id.
79  Amicus Brief of the American Trucking Association, et al., in the Supreme Court of the United States, City
of Columbus, Mitchell Brown, and Bobbie Beavers, v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., and the Towing and
Recovery Association of Ohio, No. 01-419 (March 2002).
80  American Trucking Association Amicus Brief (2002), op cit., p. 22.29
Political momentum for federal preemption was advanced by separate campaigns waged
by competitors in the overnight delivery business, Federal Express and UPS.  Federal Express,
with a fleet of over 450 airplanes and more than 30,000 trucks, became concerned when states
such as California began regulating important aspects of its business in the 1980s.
The firm was extremely frustrated with California trucking regulations, including
ones that prohibited it from offering such advantageous services to its customers
as longer credit, providing telephone rather than written claims, and a money-
back guarantee... Founder Fred Smith argued: “There has been no such thing as
purely intrastate commerce since maybe when Daniel Boone was in Tennessee.”
81
Federal Express, defined as an air carrier, was able to win a federal legal challenge to
California state regulation,
82 after which many other states chose to deregulate.  UPS, defined as
a surface carrier, now saw itself at a competitive disadvantage, and lobbied hard for federal
preemption of state regulation.  Trucking firms generally joined the mutual effort of the
overnight delivery firms to secure this reform, as they “began to see the competitive
disadvantages that they might face as a consequence of a mismatch between regulatory
regimes…”
83  Some of the disruptive, balkanized rules transport suppliers faced are directly
analogous to those proposed by state regulators in wireless.
Broadband
In emerging broadband markets, two principal competitors have emerged for residential
customers: cable modems and digital subscriber lines (DSL).  Both services are governed by
rules set at the federal level, pre-empting local and state regulation.  The issue of jurisdiction has
perhaps arisen most pointedly in the conflict over “open access” rules for cable TV systems
offering high-speed Internet access.  Local franchising authorities have in some instances sought
to impose requirements that cable operators make their systems available to independent Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), who could then offer retail services to users via cable system
connections.  This local policy has been both pre-empted and rejected by the Federal
Communications Commission in a series of rulings.  The rationale for preemption has been
                                                          
81  Teske, Best and Mintrom (1997), p. 139.
82  Federal Express Corporation v. California Public Utilities Commission, 716 F. Supp 1299 (D.C. Cal.
1989), 936 F.2d 1075f (9
th Cir. 1991), 112 S.Ct. 2956 writ certiori denied (1991).
83  Teske, Best and Mintrom (1997), p. 141.30
consistent: clear national rules will spur investment and thus make new services available to
consumers.
For instance, the FCC acted in 1999 to block local regulations being imposed by such
cities as Portland, Oregon, despite the fact that a federal district court upheld the city's action,
which was “celebrated… as protection of local authority against federal preemption.”
84   The
then-chair of the Commission, William Kennard, declared his motivation: “My No. 1 concern,
numero uno, is we’ve got to get Americans faster Internet access in their homes.”
85  While cable
systems were franchised by municipal governments, localized broadband rules would undermine
development of new broadband technologies everywhere. This led him to propose federal
preemption:
“It is in the national interest that we have a national broadband policy,” Kennard
told the audience.  That policy is to let the industry grow as the market dictates, he
said, but the decision in Portland would have a decidedly opposite effect…  “The
fact is there is a role for national policy… we have to have a national policy in
this area,” Kennard said… Taking a lead from the medical field, Kennard coined
the policy as the “Hippocratic high-tech oath—do no harm.”
86
The Commission then filed an amicus brief in AT&T/TCI v. City of Portland, a 1999 case
in which local “open access” obligations were challenged by the cable franchisee.
87   The FCC
argued for federal preemption of such regulatory disputes.
88  In a report to the Commission by
the Cable Services Bureau in October 1999, the FCC expanded its findings on the basis of
evidentiary hearings: “Rapid nationwide broadband deployment depends on a national
broadband policy.”  This was explained as follows:
There seemed to be wide agreement among our panelists that consumers would be
poorly served by a fractured broadband landscape wherein each locality devises
its own set of cable Internet access regulations.  All of the financial analysts
                                                          
84  Paul Teske and Andrey Kuljiev, Federalism, Preemption, and Implementation of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 30 PUBLIUS (Winter/Spring 2000) 53-6, p. 60.
85  William E. Kennard, quoted in, Whose Cable Are They? BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (July 5, 1999).
86  Jim Davis and Corey Grice, FCC’s Kennard Slams Open Access Ruling, CNET NEWS.COM (June 15, 1999),
http://news.com.com/2100-1033-227121.html.
87  Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Communications Commission, in AT&T v. Portland, U.S.C.A., Ninth
Circuit, Appeal No. 99-35609 (August 1999).
88  “The FCC maintains that to guarantee fast nationwide deployment of broadband services, a single national
policy is required (and, in this case one of ‘hands-off-the-Net’), and that regulation at any level may affect adversely
the speed at which firms introduce the new technologies.”   Teske and Kuljiev (2000), p. 61.31
expressed concern over the prospect of hundreds of LFAs [local franchising
authorities] regulating broadband access… The concern is that cable companies
would move away from or substantially slow cable modem deployment and focus
on telephony, thereby thwarting the public policy objective of rapid deployment
of advanced technologies to all Americans.
89
In its decision, issued in June 2000,
90 the 9
th Circuit found that cable modem service was
a service under the statutory jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission.  The issue
was resolved, then, by a Commission ruling in March 2002.  The FCC reiterated its earlier
policy:  “In a Declaratory Ruling adopted today, the FCC concluded that cable modem service is
properly classified as an interstate information service and is therefore subject to FCC
jurisdiction.”
91  The FCC went on to rule that it would be in the public interest to continue to pre-
empt local or state regulatory authority in favor of a national deregulatory policy that would
encourage broadband development:
In the interest of national uniformity, the FCC should exercise its forbearance
authority in light of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
the Portland case, which classified cable modem service as both an "information
service" and "telecommunications service."
92
The same issue of federal preemption dominated the 2002 FCC ruling on whether to
classify cable modems as “cable services,” “information services,” or “telecommunications
services.”  A “cable services” definition would expose operators to access regulations imposed
by states and/or local franchising authorities; “telecommunications services” would potentially
lead to federal regulation; “information services” would be lead to preemptive federal
deregulation.  The FCC chose the latter classification, pre-empting localities and simultaneously
deregulating cable modem service.   The decision was explained thusly:
In this part of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we address potential areas of
regulatory uncertainty at the State and local levels that could also discourage such
investment and innovation.  We would be concerned if a patchwork of State and
                                                          
89  Federal Communications Commission, Broadband Today, A Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman
(October 1999), p. 39; http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadban.doc.
90  AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3
rd 871 (9
th Cir., 2000).
91  FCC Press Release, FCC CLASSIFIES CABLE MODEM SERVICE AS "INFORMATION SERVICE,"
(March 14, 2002), http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2002/nrcb0201.html.
92 Ibid.32
local regulations beyond matters of purely local concern resulted in inconsistent
requirements affecting cable modem service, the technical design of the cable
modem service facilities, or business arrangements that discouraged cable modem
service deployment across political boundaries.  We also would be concerned if
State and local regulations limited the Commission's ability to achieve its national
broadband policy goals to promote the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans in a reasonable and timely
manner, to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media and to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.
93
Summary: Characteristic Elements Associated with Preemption
In many markets where national economies of scale and scope are crucial to efficiency,
national preemption of state regulation has occurred.  This often comes about in response to
problems with a lack of uniformity in markets where costs are particularly high, or when a
patchwork regulation reduces product experimentation, restricts investment, and raises costs.  As
demonstrated below, wireless telephony would appear to share many of the characteristics seen
in markets with federal preemption.  These factors are summarized here in Table 7.
                                                          
93  Federal Communications Commission, Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable
and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband;
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities: Declaratory Ruling and Proposed Rulemaking FCC 02-77 (March 14,
2002), Par. 9733
TABLE 7.  KEY FACTORS IN EVALUATING REGULATORY DECENTRALIZATION:
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IV. The Efficiency of National Wireless Networks
Consolidation and Lower Prices
Perhaps the best-documented observation about wireless telephone markets is that
national networks are efficient.  Annual studies of the Commercial Mobile Radio Services
market by the Federal Communications Commission – in addition to the reams of corroborating
evidence these analyses draw on – make this point repeatedly: fragmentation of wireless phone
service is extremely costly, and the emergence of broad-based systems drives costs down for
both operators and consumers.
The U.S. market has gravitated to national networks because of economic efficiency, not
due to regulatory constraints or path dependency.  Indeed, regulators allotted thousands of local
licenses, resisting any bias to impose national scope on service providers.  Economic
rationalization via mergers, joint ventures, and marketing agreements has driven aggregation of
disparate franchise areas into nationwide systems.   In contrast to the United States’ selection of
734 cellular franchise areas, 51 PCS A and B franchise areas, and 493 PCS C, D, E, and F
franchise areas, no other OECD country had more than the 11 franchise areas used by Canada.34
The great majority of countries issued national licenses for mobile wireless on the presumption
that wide area networks are efficient.
TABLE 8.  FCC LICENSE AGGREGATION IN WIRELESS TELEPHONY (2003)
Number of Licenses
Cellular PCS SMR TOTAL
AT&T 56 282 0 338
Cingular 132 89 104 325
Nextel 0 0 41,833 41,833
Sprint PCS 0 163 0 163
T-Mobile 0 269 13 282
Verizon 165 117 0 282
Nextwave 09 509 5
Others 1,434 1,660 5,185 8,279
TOTAL 1,787 2,675 47,104 51,597
Source: Universal Licensing System, FCC (http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls, visited July 31, 2003)
From a radically fragmented starting point, national networks now dominate the
marketplace.  Over nearly two decades of semi-continuous merger activity up through 2000, six
national networks emerged.  These six network operators provide the overwhelming majority of
service for the overwhelming majority of subscribers, accounting for 85.4% of service revenues
in the fourth quarter of 2002.
94  The networks are pieced together from 3,642 separate licenses
issued by regulators, and this omits the 47,104 Specialized Mobile Radio licenses which Nextel
(formerly Fleet Call) pieced together to construct a national wireless network.
95
Regulators did not foresee that this consolidation would, or should, occur.  In 1995, in
fact, the FCC theorized that national wireless service could be efficiently provided by local
suppliers.  Coordination between independent carriers could be arranged through roaming
agreements and other contractual devices:
Broader geographic markets have been asserted on several grounds.  First, some
carriers are offering ‘regional’ service options, which give customers flat-rate
calling areas as large as a whole state.  At the present time, however, such plans
                                                          
94  Legg Mason Equity Research, The Wireless Industry Scorecard: Quick Reference (4Q 2002).
95  Nextel has produced a national wireless network by acquiring 41,833 – 88.8% – of SMR licenses.
Universal Licensing System, FCC (http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls, visited July 7, 2003).35
(and customers using them) are the exception, not the rule.  Second, most T-
Mobile radio services are provided nationwide when a service, even a local one, is
provided uniformly across the nation by centrally managed companies.  Third, the
industry and some analysts speak increasingly of customers demanding ‘seamless
service.’  However, this may show simply that some customers want a recognized
national brand name on a product that remains essentially local.  In sum, while
there is evidence that regional and national markets may be emerging, it appears
that the vast majority of mobile radio services are provided in local and
metropolitan geographic markets under current conditions.
96
                                                          
96  Federal Communications Commission, First Annual CMRS [Commercial Mobile Radio Service] Report
(July 28, 1995), ¶64.










































































Source: CTIA Wireless Industry Survey and CMRS Reports.     
Assumes Top 25 market participants are entire market. 
Correlation = -0.8836
TABLE 9.  COVERAGE AND NATIONAL SCOPE OF LARGEST WIRELESS CARRIERS
Carrier POPs (mil.) Percent of U.S. Pop




Southwestern Bell 36.2 14.2
PacTel 36.5 14.3
NYNEX 26.0 10.2
              2002
Verizon Wireless 248.0 85.1
T-Mobile 242.2 83.1
Cingular Wireless 231.0 79.3
AT&T Wireless 259.0 88.9
Nextel 230.0 79.0
Sprint PCS 211.0 72.5
Sources:  1992 Data:  CTIA, State of the Cellular Industry (1992), cited in Shew (1994, Table 3-2);  2002
Coverage Data:  Legg Mason Equity Research, The Wireless Industry Scorecard (4Q 2002), p. 82;  1992
and 2002 Population: U.S. Population from http://www.census.gov/ July 16, 2003.
Marketplace evidence was soon to change the FCC’s opinion.  The emergence of
nationally-integrated networks and calling plans demonstrated that consumers were demanding
services most economically provided on a broader scale.  As larger networks formed, prices
plummeted and demand skyrocketed.  Between 1995 and 2002, the average price per minute fell
from 51¢ to 11.5¢; minutes of wireless use rose sixteen-fold.  Industry consolidation was marked
during this period.  As seen in Figure 2, the top six wireless operators served about 55% of U.S.
subscribers in the mid-1990s, but nearly 80% in 2000.  Concentration did not rise in local
markets (where, in any event, the FCC’s “spectrum cap” constrained mergers).  Instead,
fragmented wireless operators were forming national networks.37
The sharp drop in wireless telephone rates in the mid 1990s appears to be a deviation
from the pre-existing trend.  State regulatory authorities told the FCC in 1994 that cellular rates
had been fairly stable since the initiation of service in the mid 1980s.
97  Also in 1994, economist
William Shew observed that the “average price of cellular service, in nominal terms, has
exhibited a mild downward trend.”
98 Only with PCS entry and the consolidation of national
networks did rates plummet.  In Figure 1, national wireless industry concentration (as measured
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
99) and wireless phone rates (calculated as average price per
minute of use) are shown for the 1997 through 2001 period, inclusive (chosen because market
                                                          
97  The CPUC FCC Filing (1994) notes that the Commission allowed duopoly cellular carriers "to set retail
rates for any service plan based on what the market would bear and not on cost" (p. 12).  To enhance competitive
pressures, however, the CPUC mandated wholesale access to networks at rates which were projected to be profitable
for resellers.  After setting up a system in 1990 to monitor the results of the regulatory plan, the Commission
determined in 1993 that "Three years later virtually none of the Commission's expectations (for reducing rates) have
been met by industry performance" (p. 17).  New rate controls were then crafted, but the following year the CPUC
found that "none of the new or existing plans experienced any permanently lowered wholesale or retail rates" under
them (p. 18).
98  William B. Shew, Regulation, Competition, and Prices in the U.S. Cellular Telephone Industry, paper
presented to the ENSA-CREST Conference on the Economics of Radio-Based Communications, Paris (June 23-24,
1994).
99  HHI = the sum of the firm market shares squared = 
1
n
i ms ∑ , where n = number of firms in the market, ms
= market share of individual firms.  This calculation differs from the standard analysis of industrial concentration.
This metric shows total industry aggregation, not the number of competitive service providers faced by individual
customers, which is the margin of concern in the typical competition policy (or antitrust) inquiry.  Here we aim to



































































Top 6 Subs / Subscribers Average Revenue per Minute
Source: CTIA Wireless Industry Survey and CMRS Reports.     
1989-1993 Top 6 Subscriber data from Kidder Peabody & Co., Wireless World: The Mobile Telephone Industry (Spring 1994), p. 16.   38
share data are available).  During these five years the correlation between the HHI and market
prices is -0.88.  As consolidation increases, prices decline.
The importance of national scope in service provision is clear.  Seven years after the FCC
hypothesized that local wireless operations might be competitive with national networks, market
evidence clearly indicated the reverse:  subscribers wanted the lower prices and ease of use
(including roaming) made possible by consolidation and uniform national services.  Key to this
conclusion was the popularity of AT&T’s “digital one rate” plan, a service offering that
obliterates regional differences.  When first brought to market in May 1998, AT&T’s move was
considered a risky gamble, but competitors rushed to offer similar plans of their own.  The
success of AT&T’s uniform nationwide offer with customers was not lost on market rivals nor
the FCC.
The Commission has concluded previously that operators with larger footprints
can achieve certain economies of scale and increased efficiencies compared to
operators with smaller footprints.  Such benefits along with advances such as
digital technology, have permitted companies to introduce and expand innovative
pricing plans such as digital-one-rate (“DOR”) type plans, reducing prices to
consumers.
Since the end of 1999, carriers have been building nationwide footprints through
various forms of transactions.  One of the driving forces behind many of these
transactions has been the desire of large regional carriers to enhance their ability
to compete with existing nationwide operators that offer attractive nationwide
pricing plans.  More recently, national operators have sought to fill in the gaps in
their coverage areas.
100
This regulatory finding is only one of many indicating the importance of unified national
networks.  (Appendix 1 is a representative sample of such comments in the FCC’s Annual
CMRS Reports, 1995-2002.  Appendix 2 lists similar observations made by investment analysts,
buttressing such findings.)  These developments are fundamental in evaluating the optimal
regulatory jurisdiction in wireless telephony.  Because “seamless” operations are crucial to the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
see just the reverse, the relationship between consolidation of geographically dispersed ‘networks’ and price
declines due to intensifying competitive pressures.
100  Federal Communications Commission, Seventh Annual CMRS Report (June 13, 2002), pp. 13-14.39
competitiveness of wireless operators, these firms  naturally strive to homogenize their offerings
and to exploit economies of scale in advertising and marketing.  In this marketplace, non-
uniform offerings are inefficient, and wireless carriers will naturally gravitate to standard
packages to deliver the efficiencies demanded by their customers.
To comply with diverse state rules, firms have the following options.  They can choose to
sacrifice economies of scale, producing custom services state by state.  Alternatively, they can
choose to provide a national plan, tailoring it to comply with the most stringent state
requirements.  (This may be impossible if state rules actually conflict; then Balkanized service
plans would be required.)  This raises compliance costs and, ironically, eliminates the
effectiveness of most states’ regulations.  That is because the most stringent rules will be set by
regulators in another state (except in the special case when most people live in states where
regulators reach precisely the same set of ‘toughest’ rules – which would itself be an argument
for federal preemption on the grounds of administrative efficiency).
Finally, firms can adopt a hybrid approach wherein they maintain a national standard for
most markets, but customize local service where state regulation is onerous.  This sacrifices
some, if not all, scale economies, while providing a safety valve to mitigate very expensive
regulations that may be assessed in some jurisdictions.  Some rules can prompt suppliers to
‘tailor’ state-level offerings by simply exiting some markets altogether.
101  While that is unlikely
in wireless telephony due to demands for ubiquitous coverage, firms can partially ‘exit’ high-cost
markets, investing less in cell sites, base stations, marketing, and other inputs.  See Table 10 for a
summary of these responses.
                                                          
101  With patchwork state rules governing environmental claims, firms have often chosen not to provide useful
“green” products.  “As the costs associated with green marketing rise, honest manufacturers may simply cease
providing environmental information. One manufacturer testified before the FTC that ‘the Balkanization of
environmental regulation effectively bars national manufacturers from making truthful, beneficial claims about the
environmental attributes of their products and packaging.  These laws deny consumers truthful, educational and
valuable environmental information.’ According to a trade association representative, ‘if, as seems likely, conflicting
local and state regulations silence national marketers with respect to environmental claims, the ability of consumers40
TABLE 10.  REGULATORY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES BY FIRMS
WITH DIVERSE STATE RULES
Compliance Strategy  Economic Implications
Customize service
state by state
Minimizes cost of compliance in each state, but eliminates




Raises costs of regulatory compliance and eliminates effective
state regulatory function.  State with the tightest rules ‘free
rides’ by imposing its standards on other states.
Select which states to
offer a national plan,
which to offer custom
(or no) service
Eliminates some, but not all, economies of scale.
Observed characteristics of the mobile telephone services market suggest that economies
of scale and scope are important to consumers, and that the licensing scheme instituted by the
Federal Communications Commission imposed costs on the market by issuing licenses that
unnecessarily fragmented networks.  In moving to issue PCS licenses, the FCC specifically noted
that cellular markets had been atomized with licenses issued by lotteries in 734 franchise
areas.
102 It sought to promote aggregation both by licensing larger service territories in PCS, and
by awarding licenses via simultaneous auctions in which bidders could easily aggregate wireless
service areas.
As entry has occurred, industry consolidation has also intensified, with the result being
that prices have plummeted.  Consumers have demonstrated their approval by purchasing
increasing minutes of use, and wireless carriers have competed to offer rival ‘buckets’ of
nationwide minutes with uniform pricing.  These developments have not been driven by
regulators or imposed by firms, but have been the outcome of a competitive discovery process in
which underlying efficiencies have proven themselves via the market test.
Under such conditions, the implication for federal regulatory preemption is
straightforward.  To cede jurisdiction to state commissions risks undoing national network
offerings that have taken years to construct and that deliver demonstrable benefit to users.  Firms
                                                                                                                                                                                          
to make environmentally beneficial choices ... will be seriously impeded.’”  David F. Welsh, Environmental
Marketing, op cit., p. 1005.
102  ‘[T]he transaction costs associated with license resales after [cellular license] lotteries have been quite
significant.  For example, for the year 1991, these costs have been estimated at $190 million.”  Federal41
could re-localize service offerings, with the industry returning to its roots as a costly patchwork
of small-area networks.  Roaming was difficult and expensive, national marketing campaigns
impractical, and competitive forces weak.  Both users and carriers have benefited from the
economies of scale and scope that came with national pricing of national networks, a
development that is very far along and closely observed by FCC regulators.  To force firms to
readjust to locally diverse regulatory constraints would be to undo the pro-consumer investments
made over the past two decades creating efficient national networks and “digital one-rate” plans,
undermining competitive forces and threatening consumer interests.
Consolidation and Improvements in Network Quality
Gaining national geographic scope has allowed competing wireless networks to better
pursue technological upgrades and to roll-out a richer mix of services.  The result is that the
quality of wireless service has improved markedly with the emergence of wider area networks.
Uniform systems, governed by uniform rules, have contributed substantially to this crucial
dimension of consumer satisfaction.
The integration of local systems into nationwide networks allowed for economies of scale
in developing advanced applications and in deploying new technologies.  Efficiencies were
realized in research, marketing, and in purchasing equipment for both operators (e.g., base
stations) and individual customers (e.g., handsets).  In piecing together disparate network
elements, the coordination afforded the larger network often resulted in cost savings and
improved functionality.
In analyzing one of the major mergers creating a national wireless network, that between
Bell Atlantic and GTE, the Federal Communications Commission predicted just this result:
[C]ombining these wireless businesses will likely produce… system-wide
efficiencies through the common network engineering, management, purchasing,
and administrative functions, leading to earlier and broader deployment of
advanced wireless services.
103
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Communications Commission, The FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150 (Oct. 9,
1997).
103  Federal Communications Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order In re Application of GTE
Corporation, Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corporation, Transferee For Consent to Transfer Control of Domestic
and International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and Application to Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable
Landing License, CC Docket No. 98-184 (Adopted June 16, 2000), par. 377.42
While data are difficult to obtain, some evidence suggests that consolidation has been
associated with marked increases in the quality of mobile phone usage.  An industry consultancy,
Mobile EcoSystem 2003 publishes the results of tests administered by Telephia, an engineering
firm, on the proportion of calls blocked or dropped by wireless telephone subscribers.  While
data for merely the last two years (2001, 2002) are posted, they reveal sharp improvements being
made in wireless telephone reliability.  See Table 11.  The consolidation of independent local
operators by seamless national networks is consistent with such increases in quality.
TABLE 11.  THE FREQUENCY OF DROPPED OR BLOCKED
WIRELESS TELEPHONE CALLS
Dropped Calls Blocked Calls
2001 1.66% 2001 3.59%
2002 0.87% 2002 2.09%
Improvement 47.6% Improvement 41.8%
Source: Mobile EcoSystem 2003, Telephia.
V. Fragmentation and Uniformity in the Regulation of Wireless
State regulation of wireless phone systems has collided with federal jurisdiction in many
respects, with substantial preemption taking place in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 (OBRA) and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act).  State regulation of
cellular rates was preempted in OBRA, along with other regulatory functions, although the
extent to which states are foreclosed from regulating has been a subject of legal debate.
104  The
Telecom Act instituted further preemption, particularly of local zoning restrictions, which
inhibited the siting of towers for wireless networks.  Again, the extent to which state and local
authorities are prohibited from regulating is under debate.
105
The basic logic of federal preemption appears clear, however.  It was detailed in a 1998
law review article by Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A. Purcell:
                                                          
104  Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal
Regulatory Framework That Is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong,” 50 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW
JOURNAL (May 1998), http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v50no3.html.
105  “Thus, there is still no clear national policy on when local governments can oppose telecommunications
facilities based on zoning considerations.”  Teske and Kuljiev (2000), p. 63.43
Because wireless networks increasingly operate on a multistate or a nationwide
competitive basis and calls frequently traverse state borders, Congress freed wireless carriers
from the dual (federal and state) regulatory jurisdictional system designed to regulate the
monopoly common carrier activities of the former Bell system and the hundreds of independent
telephone companies around the country (such as GTE) that were not part of the Bell System.
Congress reasonably concluded that today’s wireless networks differ fundamentally from
monopoly local exchange carriers.  Indeed, a wireless call to Virginia may originate in the
District of Columbia, while the caller drives across the state line to Maryland and the call is
routed to and switched in New York.  If CMRS providers were treated like wireline carriers they
would be forced to make artificial distinctions so that their calls could be classified into historic
state or federal regulatory categories that would be antediluvian, unnecessary, and harmful.  The
imposition of these outdated requirements would impede the development of wireless in the
United States.
106
Jurisdictional issues are rarely settled in absolute terms, with federal preemption
foreclosing any local or state involvement.  Substantial public policy responsibility remains
vested in state governments, for example, even after regulatory authority for consumer protection
issues – rates, quality of service, contract disclosure – is placed in a federal agency.  For the
policy interventions now under consideration by regulators at the state and federal level,
however, it is possible to categorize the efficiency implications of alternative jurisdictions.  In
general, each of the major regulatory proposals involves substantial jurisdictional externalities
due to the strong influence of national network economies in the wireless telephone sector.
•  Advertising regulations.  National marketing campaigns, including commercial
messages distributed to nationwide audiences and high-visibility national events
sponsored by wireless carriers, could be seriously affected by advertising regulations.
To introduce non-uniformity in such rules would lead competitors to shy away from
national advertising, reducing any efficiencies to be gained there.
•  Disclosure rules.  The importance of national “one rate” plans in promoting
competition and network growth is substantial.  Disclosure rules can disrupt such
marketing efficiencies by imposing different point-of-sale procedures and conflicting
                                                          
106  Leonard J. Kennedy and Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal
Regulatory Framework That Is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull Strong,” 50 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW
JOURNAL (May 1998), http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v50no3.html.44
requirements for what information must be conveyed.  Because some proposals (such
as California’s) consider mandating lengthy written agreements and/or third-party
verification (to ensure that subscribers understand contract terms), marketing
practices could be forced “off line.”  Non-uniformity would reduce efficiencies
associated with telephone or Internet sign-ups, undermining investments in these
arrangements.
•  Minimum Trial Periods.  The six national carriers currently offer free trial periods
(during which telephone service can be terminated without payment of an “early
termination fee”) of 14-30 days.
107  Terms extending this period in some states would
alter carriers’ incentives to offer free or discounted telephones, lowering network
utilization and, in the long term, network development.
In essence, each of the proposals under consideration has the potential to impose costs on
wireless subscribers outside the state in which they are levied.  This is (a) because inefficient
rules limiting network development in one state tend to spill over to other jurisdictions, where
consumers lose benefits due to suboptimal infrastructure investment (which lowers service
quality when they roam, or when they call others who might use the infrastructure not
developed), and (b) because even efficient rules may be paid for, at least in part, by consumers in
other states.  This latter effect allows regulators to free ride; indeed, political constraints push
them to do so, as electoral power is undermined by focusing on outside interests at the expense
of constituents.
In the pattern seen among the examples above, competition between the states can work
well where locally provided services do not entail substantial external effects.  Where large
interstate networks are involved, however, spillovers occur and regulations are easier to
harmonize at the federal, rather than the state, level.  The strong national economies of scale and
scope involved in wireless networks, best demonstrated by the emergence of efficiencies with the
consolidation of national networks and “digital one-rate plans,” strongly suggest that consumer
protection regulations now under consideration should be considered at the federal, rather than
the state, level.
                                                          
107 See,  http://www.wow-com.com/PDF/CPUCbackground.pdf.45
VI. State vs. Federal Wireless Regulation: A Natural Experiment
In exploring the ‘optimal jurisdiction’ question, direct evidence revealing relative
regulatory competencies is valuable but rare.  Indirect evidence is more likely to be available,
leading one, for instance, to compare the size of the professional staff at the Montana Public
Service Commission with that of the Federal Communications Commission. Similarly, some rely
on anecdotal evidence concerning the awareness of state versus federal regulators.  A recent
episode involving a member of the California Public Utilities Commission may be suggestive:
Henry Duque, a six-year member of the California Public Utilities Commission,
testified Monday that he didn’t know until last year that his agency regulates the
wireless telecommunications industry.
108
The FCC does enjoy certain economies of scale in evaluating nationwide data with a
larger base of policy experts.  It enjoys a work force of over 2,000 full-time employees, has a
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau with staff attorneys, economists, engineers, and industry
analysts knowledgeable about mobile telephony, and issues detailed annual reports evaluating
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services market for Congress.  But, how important is the federal
regulatory advantage in crafting policies that help consumers?  After all, dispersed experiments
among the fifty states could contribute to a process that overcame the disadvantage attendant to
any one state commission’s analysis by using trial and error to discover better modes of
regulation.
Fortunately, there exists a case study that puts the issue to the test.  In the federal
deregulation of cellular telephone rates, 1993-94, alternative jurisdictions took different sides of
the issue.  In the event, federal rules trumped those of state commissions, pre-empting rate
regulations that many states were imposing and sought to continue to impose.  Because we can
now observe what happened to cellular rates following that federal preemption of state
regulation, it is possible to contrast the rival regulatory positions.  This is direct evidence as to
                                                          
108 David  Kravets,  Duque Says He Didn’t Know PUC Regulated Wireless Industry, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.
18, 2001), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/utilities/nw/nw002128.php3.  In fairness to Commissioner Duque, the
position that the State of California merely regulates wireless telephone carriers in a formalistic, ineffectual manner
since federal preemption of rate controls in 1994 (and possibly before) would be a compelling argument backed by
empirical support.  That this seems not to have been the position embraced by Commissioner Duque, however,
seemingly undermines this defense.46
which jurisdiction has most effectively protected economic efficiency and, thus, consumer
interests.
Federal Preemption and Deregulation of Cellular Rates in 1994
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 preempted regulation of cellular rates
by the states as of August 10, 1994, one year from the day of enactment.  The rationale for
preemption was that the Federal Communications Commission was responsible for spectrum
allocation and licensing and, in this capacity, was the logical nexus of authority for related
regulatory decision making.  Specifically, in licensing other wireless entrants, only the FCC
could create consistent rules for direct competitors.  Because asymmetric regulation by the
several states could clearly disrupt competitive forces, Congress vested the national regulatory
agency with control over rates.
States that had been regulating cellular prices, however, were given one year to petition
the FCC to request authority to continue regulating.  Twenty-three states regulated rates in some
way, and petitions to continue rate regulation were filed by eight (see Table 11).  All were
denied, and state regulation was preempted.  The arguments employed by the states, however,
are of interest.  The petitioners argued the following:
•  cellular telephone service was not fully competitive;
•  competitive entry would eliminate the need for regulation, but not until competition
actually arrived in the market;
•  there was no telling how long it would take the upcoming PCS licensees to become
full-fledged wireless telephone competitors;
•  until they were, state-level rate controls were needed to protect consumers.
As the State of New York argued, “the market for cellular services is not fully
competitive, and, therefore, state regulation, as it is employed in New York, serves as a
deterrence to anticompetitive and discriminatory practices.”
109  This is not an implausible
argument, and it is now testable (we turn to the evidence, below).  There are costs as well as
                                                                                                                                                                                          
109 Federal  Communications  Commission,  In the Matter of Implementation of Sections 3 (n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services:  Petition to Extend Rate Regulation, PR 94-108
(Aug. 5, 1994), submitted by the New York Public Service Commission, William J. Cowan, General Counsel [“New
York FCC Filing (1994)”.]  The petition also stated:  “Absent a fully competitive market, continued light rate
regulation is required to ensure that rates do not become unjust, discriminatory, or unreasonable.”   Ibid., p. 7.47
benefits inherent in public policy.  Customers, firms, and regulators respond to constraints in
multiple ways.  Moreover, the ability of regulators, given limited information about costs,
demands, substitutes and technology, to successfully constrain prices cannot simply be assumed.
Curiously, evidence that state regulation proved ineffectual was introduced – and then
ignored.  New York regulators conceded that, “In general, cellular companies have been lightly
regulated by this Commission.”
110  In fact, cellular operators did file tariffs with the New York
State Public Service Commission, but regulators engaged in no substantial review of such rates
(established by the firms themselves).
111
The appeal to postpone preemption was made, therefore, on the grounds that continuing
the  threat of substantive regulatory intervention was constraining duopoly cellular pricing.
“However, the Commission retained the discretion to impose the stricter regulation permitted by
the Public Service Law should it appear necessary.”
112  The California petition made similar
claims, complaining that state rate regulation had failed to suppress prices but pleading for the
opportunity to continue setting “just and reasonable” rates.  In particular, the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) paradoxically based its request for continued rate regulation on the
finding that
Cellular rates in California are among the highest in the nation, and have failed to
decline commensurate with substantial declines in capital and operating costs of
providing cellular service…
113
California noted that it “allowed the cellular industry to set retail rates for any
service plan based on what the market would bear and not on cost.”
114  This regulatory
approach was adopted due to limited knowledge state regulators had about how to deal
with an evolving market.  “Because the cellular market was relatively new at the time, the
CPUC took a hands-off approach to rate regulation, hoping that rates would come down
                                                          
110  New York FCC Filing (1994), Appendix III, p. 5.
111  “Price caps are proposed by operators and are not subjected to any test of reasonableness by the [New York
Public Service] commission, so there appears to be no effective regulation.”  Shew (1994), p. 21.
112  New York FCC Filing (1994), p. 5.
113 Federal  Communications  Commission,  In the Matter of Implementation of Sections 3 (n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services:  Petition of the People of the State of California
and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California to Retain State Regulatory Authority over Intrastate
Cellular Service Rates, PR 94-108 (Aug. 8, 1994) [“California FCC Filing (1994)”], p. 2.
114  California FCC Filing (1994), p. 12.48
in time as economies of scale occurred and the cost of doing business declined.
Unfortunately, this has not occurred.”
115
TABLE 12.  STATE REGULATION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE (JAN. 1993)
































































29 Jurisdictions 14 Jurisdictions 9 Jurisdictions 8 Jurisdictions
Source:  Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, Semi-Annual Report on State Regulation (January
1993) and Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Announces Establishment of Dockets for Materials Filed in
Connection with State Petitions for Authority to Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio Service Rates,” Public Notice,
DA 94-1043 (September 22, 1994).
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Whatever the merits of state rate regulation in 1994, we now have an opportunity to test
the hypothesis advanced by state commissions which regulated rates.
116  As the CPUC put it:
“Nevertheless, the presence of rate regulation has probably prevented rates from being even
higher and certainly has not contributed to higher rates.”
117  But the claim is not accompanied by
analysis.  It is an empirical question as to whether state regulation was causing cellular telephone
rates to rise or fall.  California’s rules allowed operators to set initial tariffs and then to file for
permission to change rates.  This provided asymmetric incentives where rate increases are
anticipated to be more difficult to obtain than rate decreases, predictably raising rates by slowing
rate reductions. In any event, elimination of state rate regulation allows one to evaluate whether
market evidence post-regulation indicates that pro-consumer regulation was, in fact, applied.
Aggregate National Price and Usage Trends
The effect of state regulation of cellular telephone rates is first observed with national
price and subscriber penetration trends.  If state regulators effectively limited quality-adjusted
prices, then releasing this constraint would result in a price fly-up.  Costs would quickly rise for
consumers, and subscriber growth would slow (or reverse).  This could be true even if the
observed price differences across states did not favor consumers in regulated jurisdictions.  As
New York argued in its 1994 petition, the mere threat of state rate regulation constrained prices
charged by operators.  With state regulators powerless to rollback rates due to federal
preemption, cellular rates would thereby be predicted to noticeably increase.  This increase
would manifest itself in two ways:
•  A sharp rise in cellular rates.  Rather than raise rates over an extended period of time,
cellular operators would set prices at market levels with state regulatory constraints
removed.
118  Rate increases should be visible in aggregate national data over the
                                                          
116  The fact that not all states regulated rates does not diminish the usefulness of the test.  When efficient,
regulatory decentralization improves consumer welfare overall.
117  California FCC Filing 1994, p. 46.
118  In some contexts, it is argued that firms price strategically to prevent regulation.  But this is implausible in
this instance.  The national market was highly deconcentrated, and the probability that an individual operator’s price
increase would result in re-regulation was virtually nil.  As Shew (1994) notes, the cable industry faced the threat of
federal re-regulation in 1992, but rates appeared unaffected through debate, and passage, of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.50
1993-1995 period surrounding rate deregulation via federal preemption (effective
August 10, 1994).
•  A decline in subscriber growth.  Given the negative relationship between price and
quantity demanded, consumers should respond to rate increases by reducing the
amount of wireless service purchased.  This is probably best measured by minutes of
use (MOU), which reflects consumption by both new and existing subscribers.
Subscriber growth also reflects changes in service quality, providing an important
cross-check on rate data.
119
In fact, however, average national cellular rates declined appreciably in the immediate
post-regulation period.  In 1993, the average price per MOU was 57¢.  In 1995, it declined to
51¢, a reduction of nearly 12 percent.  The reduction does not appear to have been due to
long-term trends preceding rate deregulation.  In fact, in the previous two-year period, 1991-93,
the average price per MOU increased 10.5%.  Output growth, whether measured by total U.S.
MOU or by subscribership, also appears strong in the period following deregulation.  MOU, in
percentage terms, grew 36% faster in the two-year period straddling federal preemption of state
regulation than in the same period preceding deregulation.  That usage and subscribership both
grew faster in percentage terms in the later period is a stunning result, given the higher base from
which they start.
TABLE 13.  RATES AND USAGE AROUND 1994 FEDERAL PREEMPTION
OF STATE REGULATION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE RATES
Metric 1991 1993 1995 91/93 (%)  93/95 (%)
$price/MOU 0.51 0.57 0.51 11.76 -10.53
MOU (billions) 11.2 19.2 37.8 71.43 96.88
Subscribers
(millions)
7.6 16.0 33.8 110.53 111.25
Source:  Morgan Stanley Equity Research, Wireless Telecom Services (March 4, 2003), p. 7.
                                                          
119  That is because falling rates may be associated with quality reductions (or increasing rates with quality
improvements).  Demand exhibits a negative relationship between price and quantity all else remaining constant,
such that price and quantity can be positively correlated (without violating the Law of Demand) when quantity is
changing.  Examining subscriber (or MOU) growth in response to regulatory changes allows consumers to respond
to both price and quality changes.51
There is no evidence that the national wireless market suffered ill effects from federal
preemption of state rate regulation in 1994.  At an aggregated, national level, price and output
both respond positively.  The pro-consumer improvements may not be due to deregulation, and
FCC reports tend to attribute the rate declines beginning about the time of federal preemption to
the anticipated entry of PCS competitors.  What can be said, however, is that the prediction of
several state public service commissions – including those of California and New York, where
substantial resources and relatively large professional staff are available to evaluate economic
trends – is rejected by marketplace evidence.  State regulation did not generally lower rates or
benefit consumers.
It is important to remember that this test of state jurisdiction takes place prior to the entry
of new PCS licensees, which began providing service in a few markets in late 1995 or early
1996.  The pro-consumer outcomes cannot be directly ascribed to a change in market structure.
While the coming of PCS was quite possibly a factor motivating service improvements by
cellular operators bracing for intensifying competitive pressures, state regulators pleaded for
continued rate regulation authority knowing that the PCS rule making was proceeding and that
new licenses were likely to be issued.  California’s petition stated that, “We envision that in the
not too distant future market forces of competition will police the mobile market and allow for an
orderly withdrawal of government oversight.”
120  Yet, the California petition saw state regulation
as establishing rates that were “just and reasonable,” and predicted that were state controls not to
continue for another eighteen months, consumers would be adversely affected.  The national data
appear to contradict this view.
More dramatic, of course, are the improvements in price, usage, and functionality that
drive the wireless telephone market in the late 1990s.  With the arrival of new competitors, prices
declined to 11.5¢ per MOU in 2002 (see Figure 3), and total annual MOU rose to over 600
billion.  Given that regulators in California and other states established pre-1994 cellular rates as
“just and reasonable,” it now appears that regulation was entirely ineffective – relative to pro-
competitive policies instituted at the federal level – in protecting consumer interests.
                                                          
120  California FCC Filing (1994), p. 80.52
Cross Sectional Analysis of State Rate Regulation
A few studies analyze price differences during the period prior to federal preemption.  As
some states regulated cellular rates and others did not, observing differences in pricing between
the jurisdictions may show the effectiveness of state regulation.  In general, rates appear to have
been higher in regulated markets; the key question is how to interpret the causal connection
between the two variables (regulatory status and market prices).
 The first issue that arises in cross-sectional studies of cellular rate regulation is how to
define the prevailing control regime.  State rules differ widely, and are not simply categorized as
“regulated” or “unregulated.”  Some states banned cellular regulation by statute, while others
simply failed to regulate rates due to explicit or implicit actions taken by the state’s public
service commission.  Those states that imposed rate rules on cellular carriers did so in different
ways.  Some regulated wholesale rates (those charged to cellular resellers), others retail rates,
some both.  Some states capped rates based on “market prices,” others established rates based on
rate of return regulation.  Some states simply required that tariffs be filed; others that notice be
given for changes; others that permission to change rates be obtained.  Abstracting from many of
these details, the Cellular Telephone Industry Association (the principal trade association of
cellular operators
121) categorized  regulatory regimes (see Table 12).
Shew (who provides his own regulatory classifications) compared prices across regimes.
Shew adjusted for demographic and economic characteristics of local markets while examining
rates charged in 95 cellular markets for the years 1985, 1988, and 1991.  He discovered prices
were typically higher when regulated, but not (in two of three regressions) by statistically
significant margins.  He concluded that, “The results provide no evidence that customers have
benefited from price regulation.”
122
Another study uses a distinct data set to arrive at roughly similar conclusions.  Tomaso
Duso examines cellular telephone service charges across 122 U.S. markets during the December
1984 to July 1988 period.
123  This study found that prices in regulated markets were somewhat
higher than those found in unregulated markets, but that these differences are generally not
                                                          
121  CTIA is still the acronym for the industry trade group, but its full name has been changed to the Cellular
Telecommunications and Internet Association.  See: http://www.wow-com.com/.
122 Shew  (1994),  p.35.
123 Tomaso  Duso, Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular Industry,
Discussion Paper FS IV 01-03, Forschungsschwerpunk Marktprozeß  und Unternehmensentwicklung (January
2001).53
statistically significant.  Moreover, the “cost drivers” which appear significant in explaining
prices in estimated regressions, were usually “slightly higher” in regulated markets.  This begs
the question of causality, which cannot be answered directly by statistical analysis.  Yet, the
evidence again tends to reject the hypothesis that rate regulation is associated with gains for
consumers.
Penetration in Deregulated States After Federal Preemption
One question brought up in the Duso study concerns the issue of whether or not states
that were regulated prior to 1994 were systematically different than states that were not.  If so,
and if these differences were entirely independent of the regulatory regimes implemented, then
the positive correlation between higher rates and state regulation (as found by Shew) would
appear spurious, a statistical observation unrelated to the issue of whether regulation pushed
prices higher.  One way to shed light on this question is to see how prices, or subscriber growth,
perform in the post-regulation period.54
Source:  Herschel Shosteck and Associates, Ltd., Data Flash: The Cellular Market Quarterly Review, Vol. 10, No. 4
(September, 1996).  Federal Communications Commission, Seventh Annual CMRS Report (June 13, 2002), Table 3.
In Table 14, quarterly wireless subscriber data for the top ten U.S. markets, 1990-1996, is
summarized.
124  The regulated markets consist of New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Boston.  This classification is based on a 1994 report by the California Public Utilities
Commission,
125 and is consistent with categorizations by the cellular operators’ trade association
(see Table 12).
126   These data allow for an analysis that abstracts from complex pricing issues.
                                                          
124  Data from cities outside the top ten markets are not available from Shosteck, and are exceedingly difficult
to obtain.
125  California Public Utilities Commission, Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into Mobile
Telephone Service and Wireless Communications, Decision 94-08-022 (Aug. 3, 1994), Appendix 2.
126  One question that arises relates to the categorization of Illinois as a Partially Regulated state in the listing
compiled by the Cellular Telephone Industry Association.  (See Table 12.)  This is resolved by Shew (1994, p. 21),
which provides a more detailed description of state regulatory regimes, noting that the Illinois Commerce
Commission eliminated cellular rate regulation in a 1988 ruling, which phased out price controls 1988-1990.  Shew
also notes that, while New York regulators imposed price caps, the caps “were proposed by operators and [are] not
subjected to any test of reasonableness by the commission, so there appears to be no effective regulation.”  (Ibid.)
TABLE 14.  PENETRATION RATES IN DEREGULATED VS. UNREGULATED
TOP 10 CELLULAR MARKETS, 1990-2001
Markets in Regulated States
March 1990 September 1996 December
2001
New York 1.50% 5.40% 47.00%
Los Angeles 2.30% 10.50% 46.00%
Boston 3.10% 17.30% 47.00%
San Francisco 1.80% 13.40% 49.00%
Weighted Avg. 1.96% 9.64% 47.00%
Markets in Unregulated States
March 1990 September 1996 December
2001
Washington-Baltimore 3.20% 18.80% 53.00%
Philadelphia 2.40% 13.80% 48.00%
Chicago 3.40% 20.30% 49.00%
Detroit 3.40% 26.50% 51.00%
Houston 2.30% 17.90% 50.00%
Dallas 2.50% 18.10% 46.00%
Weighted Avg. 2.95% 19.27% 49.50%55
Subscriber levels are a rough indicator of consumer satisfaction; the higher the growth rate
(relative to an underlying trend determined by non-regulatory variables), the better the bundle
delivered to customers (taking prices, service quality, customer service, and all other product
dimensions into account), as evaluated by customers themselves.
127
Two things are apparent from Table 14.  The first is that penetration (subscribers as a
percent of local market population) in regulated markets was considerably below subscribership
in unregulated markets in 1990 and 1996, but had nearly caught up by 2001.
128   This broadly
supports Shew’s conclusion that regulation was associated with higher rates, a finding explained
as follows.
In states with regulation, three impediments to price competition existed.  First, when
tariffs are publicly filed, changes are quickly communicated (to competitors), often (by law) in
advance of actual price reductions.  Shew found this had a very large potential effect on prices,
and it is easy to see how this would reduce incentives to engage in price competition.  Second,
when tariff changes have to be approved by utility commissions, it deters firms from lowering
rates because, should demand conditions change, operators face a cost in requesting permission
to raise rates back to previous levels.  Third, because operators have substantial input as to where
price levels are initially set (under rate of return or price cap regimes), they will tend to favor
higher prices (initially and over time) where they believe that price reductions will be easier to
obtain than rate increases.  High rates become, effectively, an insurance policy against “get
tough” policies by regulators.
In any event, the difference in the ratio of penetration rates (regulated to unregulated
markets) narrows considerably during the seven years following federal preemption.  By
December 2001, previously regulated markets have about 47% mobile phone penetration, while
the never-regulated markets have penetration rates of about 49.5%.  The factors limiting wireless
phone use appear to have faded not immediately (see 1996 data) but over time.
                                                          
127  One weakness of the penetration metric is that it does not reflect changes in usage by infra-marginal
customers.  So, if subscribers use their wireless telephones more, but not many new individuals subscribe, consumer
gains may not be evident.  There is little evidence that trends in minutes of use and subscriber levels actually
diverge, however, so it is reasonable to use either as proxies for consumer preferences.
128  This is true even when New York City is eliminated from the analysis.  As noted above, New York was
considered a regulated state in CPUC analysis and by the CTIA, but was seen as having a non-binding price cap
regime by Shew (1994, p. 21).  Moreover, the Shosteck data for New York City are highly variable, and appear to
contain errors.56
TABLE 15.  STARTING DATES FOR REGULATED AND
UNREGULATED CELLULAR SYSTEMS
Cellular License B (Wireline)
Cellular License A (Non-
Wireline)
New York April 1984 April 1986
Los Angeles June 1984 March 1987
San Francisco April 1985 September 1986
Boston January 1985 January 1985
Chicago October 1983 January 1985
Washington, DC April 1984 December 1983
Philadelphia July 1984 February 1986
Detroit October 1984 July 1985
Houston September 1984 May 1986
Dallas July 1984 March 1986
Source:  Kagan Cellular Telephone Atlas (1998).
A factor that may explain this pattern may be the initial tardiness of the cellular operators
to offer service in regulated markets.   By the time that the last regulated system in our sample,
the non-wireline licensee in Los Angeles, began serving customers in March 1987, non-wireline
licensees in unregulated states had been operating for an average of 20 months.  (See Table 15.)
The mean time in the regulated sample: 10.75 months.  Two of the four regulated non-wireline
licensees opened for business after all six unregulated systems had begun operations, mirroring
the relative entry delay among wireline licensees.  This substantial head start clearly put the
unregulated systems in the pole position in the race for subscribers.  Whether the regulated
system lag was related to state rate regulation is unknown.57
Source:  Herschel Shosteck and Associates, Ltd., Data Flash: The Cellular Market Quarterly Review, Vol. 10, No. 4
(September, 1996).
What is known is that subscriber growth across both sets of markets is higher in the post-
preemption years.  See Figure 4.  If the Shosteck quarterly data are truncated at September 1994
(the first month federal cellular deregulation was imposed on the states), it is seen that both
regulated and unregulated markets experience higher penetration gains in percentage terms.  An
important argument for this policy reform was that eliminating state by state rate regulation
would result in greater efficiencies in the provision of regional or national networks, and that
such economies would result in consumer gains.  The observed increases in subscriber growth
are consistent with this view.
They are also consistent with the hypothesis that state regulation of wireless telephony
has effects that spillover into other states.  National wireless penetration appears to respond
positively to federal preemption, providing a strong argument that the policy was efficient.  It is
buttressed by the fact that subscriber growth is higher everywhere post preemption, not just in
deregulated states.  Subscriber growth in states that were unregulated exceeds growth in states
deregulated through federal preemption, through 1996.  (See Table 16.)  This supports the view
that wireless telephone regulation is properly based at the federal level.
Figure 4. Wireless Subscriber Penetration Growth Before and After Federal 









































































































































































Never Regulated Regulated Predicted Never Regulated Predicted Regulated
Federal Preemption58
TABLE 16.  QUARTERLY PENETRATION GROWTH





Markets under State Regulation 0.25% 0.58% 2.29
Markets not under Regulation 0.37% 1.05% 2.86
Ratio 1.44 1.81  
Source: Subscriber and Penetration Rate data from "Data Flash The Cellular Market Quarterly Review, Quarterly
Survey September, 1996 Vol. 10, No. 4.," Herschel Shosteck and Associates, Ltd., June 1997.
Summary of the Natural Experiment
The evidence is strong that consumers did not benefit from state regulation of cellular
telephone rates.  During the period prior to federal preemption, rates tended to be higher in
regulated markets, and some of this difference may have been due to inefficiencies imposed by
state rules (including higher lag times for market entry).  After federal preemption, rates did not
shoot up in regulated states, or across markets generally.  If state regulation, or the threat of state
regulation, were constraining prices for customers this would have occurred.  Importantly, even
in markets where incumbent duopoly providers possessed substantial pricing power,
129 state
regulators proved unable to (a) protect consumers via rate regulation; (b) learn from their policy
experiment, arguing for a continuation of price controls (and against federal preemption).  Due to
the failure of such arguments to carry the day, and the ultimate success of deregulation
(including preemption of state price caps), we conclude that state cellular regulation did not
benefit consumers.  This finding can be used to evaluate federal preemption of other state
regulatory rules.
                                                          
129  The California Public Utilities Commission generously cited my work in establishing that cellular providers
possessed market power.  See CPUC (Aug. 3, 1994), pp. 37-8, 50-1, 53, 61, 64.  This is just another demonstration
of the principle that markets do not have to work perfectly (or even very well) to beat the regulated alternative,
which may also be highly imperfect.  This crucial point has often been noted by economist Alfred Kahn.59
VII. Conclusion
In their lengthy law review article analyzing the optimal jurisdiction for determining
when federal, as opposed to state, antitrust regulation was appropriate, Robert P. Inman and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld propose a seven-part test.
130  The results of this approach suggest that
federal preemption of state regulatory intervention is appropriate when the following three
questions can be answered in the affirmative:
•  Is the proposed national regulatory activity justifiably national in scope involving
national externalities?
•  Is the proposed regulatory activity… efficiently provided at the national level?
•  Do the potential efficiency advantages of the proposed legislation outweigh the likely
loss of political participation when policies are decided at the national rather than at
the state level?
131
Economic analysis of the wireless telephone industry provides the answers to these
questions – each is affirmative.  The first and second questions are answered jointly: the industry
is clearly characterized by strong national network effects, and policies adopted (by a company
or a state regulatory authority) in one part of the country tend to have important implications for
consumers and carriers in other parts of the country.
The drop in per-minute charges from over $0.50 per minute to just above $0.10 from the
mid 1990s to today has been accompanied by two distinct, reinforcing trends: competitive entry
and national network consolidation.  Mobile wireless services are efficiently provided, packaged,
and sold via national service plans.  This has been learned, not assumed, as regulation initially
forced an atomistic licensing grid on the industry.  The wireless phone industry employed
innovative products and business models, specifically traced by the FCC to the introduction of
AT&T’s “Digital One Rate Plan” in May 1998, to discover a more efficient organizational
structure.  Analyses by the Federal Communications Commission repeatedly stress the
importance of seamless wireless networks in meeting customer demands.  Many of these
                                                          
130  Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing
Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1203-1299 (May
1997), p. 1290.
131 Ibid.60
comments are found in Appendix 1.  One representative observation is this passage from the
Fourth Annual Commercial Mobile Radio Services Report issued in 1999:
[O]perators with larger footprints can achieve economies of scale and increased
efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints.  The need for
increased size was exacerbated in the past year by the introduction and success of
AT&T’s DOR plan and, in particular, its low-cost roaming feature.  According to
analysts, it can be significantly more expensive for regional operators to provide
customers with this feature than for national operators (pp. 15-16).
Competitive rivalry has pushed all firms to adapt, seizing the efficiencies of national
scope to offer the services – and prices – demanded by consumers.  Local service provision has
been replaced by aggregation of thousands of wireless licenses and nationalization of service
plans offered subscribers.  Subscribers have rewarded companies providing harmonized wireless
telephone networks, and idiosyncratic state regulatory regimes threaten such efficiencies.
The last hurdle to be scaled in the Inman-Rubinfeld test is a political judgment.  Does
federal preemption, when resulting in economic efficiency, also rationalize legislative decision
making?  Fortunately, we have a direct test of the competency of federal vs. state regulatory
efforts, efforts which embed the political advantages of federalism (state jurisdiction).  The test is
the consumer protection offered by state rate regulation of cellular telephony.  When preempted
by federal legislation in 1993 and decisions by the FCC in 1994 (denying state petitions to
continue regulation beyond the August 10, 1994 preemption enacted by Congress), market
evidence reveals state price regulation failed to protect consumers:
•  Rates in regulated states were generally higher than rates in unregulated states prior to
federal preemption;
•  Service provision in regulated states appears to have lagged (started later) than in
unregulated states;
•  Cross-sectional multivariate studies prior to preemption suggest that states imposing
rate regulation featured rates that were either higher, or no lower, than other states;
•  Subscriber growth appears to rise faster after federal preemption.
Federal policymakers pursued a pro-consumer path in deregulating cellular rates and
awarding new licenses to PCS operators.  Prices declined rapidly after preemption, belying the
predictions of price increases made by state regulatory commissions attempting to extend61
controls.  These included the best staffed, most expert of the state commissions, those of
California and New York.  The California PUC conducted an extensive investigation in the
cellular telephone market, and offered this assessment of regulation in August 1994:
[E]ven though the cellular rates of major California carriers remain among the
most expensive in the nation, as indicated by the NCRA [National Cellular
Resellers Association] study, at least they have not significantly increased their
rates… We believe that the presence of regulation in California served as a
restraint on carriers’ tendency to raise rates when compared with carriers in other
states which do not regulate carriers.
132
This analysis was faulty even prior to the empirical evidence gleaned following federal
preemption.  California regulators argued that high prices were no more of a problem to
consumers than rising prices, which is clearly false.  California consumers are not compensated
for the higher prices they paid by the knowledge that at least these high prices were stable.
Under a regime of deregulated federal preemption, on the other hand, California consumers have
been compensated in cash.  With nationwide service plans, and rapidly falling prices among
national networks, they have had the opportunity to save money along with consumers in other
states.
Moreover, the empirical evidence that was soon to become available reveals that,
following preemption, rates did not increase when caps were removed.  Rate regulation – at best
– had no effect.  At worst, it actually raised rates by reducing competitive forces and introducing
incentives for firms to delay price reductions.
The federal preemption of state cellular rate regulation shows that decentralized political
decision making did not add value for customers.  Today’s market, which has generated great
increases in efficiency by developing six competing national networks, owes much to regulatory
harmonization, suggesting that the results of a reverse experiment today would likewise
underscore the deleterious effects of balkanization.  As one prominent industry analyst notes,
“Regulatory initiatives such as the proposed “Bill of Rights” legislation [in California]… could
have a disruptive effect on the industry.”
133  That regulations in one state may disrupt the
industry in general suggests policy responsibility is efficiently vested at the federal level.
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Appendix 1.
Key FCC Findings Regarding Competition, Consolidation,
and Regulation of Wireless Telephone Networks, 1995-2002
FIRST ANNUAL CMRS (COMMERCIAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICES)
REPORT (Adopted 7/28/95)
Page Excerpt
1 CMRS is a part of the telecommunications business that is undergoing
major changes that have resulted in growing competition, convergence and
popularity, all under a system of reduced regulation.
1-2 Cellular service in automobiles and via portable telephones has become a
universally recognized business tool, and its providers have recently begun
to target their marketing strategies towards the mass consumer market.
2 …CMRS may become a single market of telecommunications for ‘people
on the move.’
5 Second, because lotteries are not necessarily won by the applicants that
value the licenses most, many licenses, particularly for Block A, were
initially won by persons who later sold their licenses to more experienced
telecommunications providers for substantial sums of money.
11 The Commission is also replacing its traditional licensing of individual base
stations by regulations that allow wide-area licensing similar to that of
cellular systems. … Thus, while SMRs’ service areas generally encompass
local markets, they will increasingly be able to expand easily to serve
regional and nationwide markets.  Moreover, while there are thousands of
SMRs in the United States, there is a trend towards consolidation which
may leave one to three large SMRs per market, plus a fringe of smaller
SMRs.
19 The Commission’s Third CMRS Report and Order contained an analysis of
trends in CMRS and found that the direction is away from a ‘balkanized
view’ that sees cellular, SMRs, paging, etc., competing in separate markets:
growth in the wireless marketplace is bringing with it an increasing degree
of service convergence.  Technology and consumer demand, facilitated by
our general policy not to restrict the services that can be provided over any
particular band, are prompting commercial service providers to follow
marketing strategies that blur the difference between the various services
comprising the wireless marketplace.
19 The principal force driving this convergence, the Commission noted, was
the desire of carriers to meet the demand of their customers for ‘one-stop
shopping,’ the ability to buy at one place a mixture of differenT-Mobile63
serves.  For its part, the Commission emphasized that its policy is to allow
such convergence.
20 Already, there is evidence of declining cellular prices and increasing
features, which has been attributed to PCS’s approach.  Also adding to the
blurring and intensity would be any Commission action that facilitates the
consolidation of small SMRs into wide-area systems providing mobile
telephone service.
20-21 Broader geographic markets have been asserted on several grounds.  First,
some carriers are offering ‘regional’ service options, which give customers
flat-rate calling areas as large as a whole state.  At the present time,
however, such plans (and customers using them) are the exception, not the
rule.  Second, most mobile radio services are provided nationwide when a
service, even a local one, is provided uniformly across the nation by
centrally managed companies.  Third, the industry and some analysts speak
increasingly of customers demanding ‘seamless service.’  However, this
may show simply that some customers want a recognized national brand
name on a product that remains essentially local.  In sum, while there is
evidence that regional and national markets may be emerging, it appears
that the vast majority of mobile radio services are provided in local and
metropolitan geographic markets under current conditions.64
SECOND ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 3/6/97)
Page Excerpt
I Our examination of the commercial mobile radio services (CMRS) industry
indicates that competition in the mobile marketplace is emerging. . . as many
as four new competitors have been licensed to provide CMRS in each market
throughout the Nation.
2 Mobile telecommunications initially consisted largely of discrete services that
did not compete with each other to any significant degree, were used by
relatively few customers, and were regulated in a traditional public utility
manner by the Commission and by most states.
3 This trend towards reduced regulation is continuing, as the Commission is
licensing geographic area SMR systems that can compete on a more equal
footing with cellular service and PCS to meet a variety of consumer and
business needs.
7 [L]ack of uniformity has significant implications for cellular carriers as well,
particularly those that seek to meld their cellular and broadband PCS properties
into a seamless, nationwide telecommunications service that bundles wireless,
local, long distance, and paging into a single product under a nationally
recognized brand name.
11 The second half of 1995 and 1996 have witnessed continued consolidation
among major cellular operators.  Much of this consolidation has occurred in a
continuing effort to create national and supraregional footprints of cellular
coverage.
14 Greater geographic scope has broadened the number of pricing packages as
well.
39-40 Traditionally, SMRs were small, independent companies, unaffiliated with
larger communications companies.  The SMR environment has changed
considerably in the last few years.  The Commission recently changed its Rules
to permit telephone companies and their affiliates (e.g., cellular companies) to
own SMRs.. . . . . This will facilitate the implementation of new spectrum
efficient technologies and enable small SMRs to consolidate into wide-area
SMRs.  Thus, while SMRs’ service areas generally encompass local markets,
they will increasingly be able to expand easily to serve regional and
nationwide markets.65
THIRD ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 5/14/98)
Page Excerpt
16-17 The process of license consolidation in the mobile telephone market
discussed in the Second Report continues to occur.  In general, operators are
acquiring new licenses to gain the efficiencies of larger and/or more cohesive
footprints and the marketing possibilities of multiple product offerings.  To
date, consolidation has not significantly reduced the number of providers of a
given service within a geographic market.  Most of the activity in the CMRS
license secondary market over the past year fits into three categories:
footprint expansion, footprint refinement, and rural investment.
Footprint Expansion.  Since the first cellular licenses were granted, mobile
telephone operators have been accumulating licenses to expand their
footprints into new regions in hopes of capitalizing on the various
efficiencies associated with economies of scale.
Footprint Refinement.  In addition to the outright acquisition of new wireless
licenses, operators often exchange licenses with other operators to fill in gaps
around their existing clusters.  In one of the largest examples in the past year,
United States Cellular Corporation ("US Cellular") and BellSouth
Corporation ("BellSouth") swapped 34 cellular licenses.  US Cellular
received a controlling interest in 12 licenses around its existing service areas
in Wisconsin and Illinois.  In return, BellSouth obtained ownership interests
in 22 licenses, most of which were situated around its existing clusters in
Kentucky and Tennessee.
22-23 The three operators executing nationwide strategies are identified at the top
of Table 4 in Appendix A.  AT&T Corp. ("AT&T"), Sprint PCS, and Nextel
are all in the process of deploying systems that will allow them to offer
seamless coverage throughout most of the country on their own networks.
Sprint PCS' licenses will allow it to reach the largest number of potential
customers with unduplicated coverage of approximately 243 million POPs.
AT&T and Nextel are close behind with 234 million and 230 million
unduplicated POPs.  It is important to note that because Nextel's coverage is
based on SMR licenses with smaller amounts of spectrum, it has a lower total
of MHz-POPs than its two nationwide competitors.
The next category of mobile telephone operators consists of those who are
executing large regional strategies, or super-regions.  This group includes
LECs relying on their cellular and broadband PCS licenses (e.g., BellSouth,
SBC, and GTE Corp. ("GTE")) and pure wireless operators who are relying
almost entirely on their broadband PCS licenses (e.g., NextWave Telecom,
Inc. ("NextWave"), Omnipoint Corp. ("Omnipoint"), and PrimeCo Personal
Communications L.P. ("PrimeCo")).  In order to compete against those66
operators with nationwide footprints, some operators have formed alliances
designed to simulate a national presence.  For example, PrimeCo has signed
a roaming agreement with its two partner companies (Bell Atlantic Corp.
("Bell Atlantic") and Airtouch Communications, Inc. ("Airtouch")) that will
allow its broadband PCS customers to access their wireless service on
cellular networks covering two-thirds of the nation's POPs, including 35 of
the top 50 cities.  In addition, thirteen broadband PCS operators have formed
the North American GSM Alliance to facilitate roaming throughout North
America for customers using Global System for Mobile Communications
("GSM") mobile telephones.
31 So far this year, broadband PCS licensees have entered into several joint
ventures making use of the Commission's partitioning and disaggregation
rules.67
FOURTH ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 6/10/99)
Page Excerpt
11 The most dramatic change in the mobile telephone industry since the release of
the Third Report has been the widespread adoption of what are often referred
to as ‘digital-one-rate’ price plans… While the details of various operators’
plans differ, they generally include some combination of the following:
bundles of large quantities of minutes for a fixed monthly rate translated into at
a low per-minute price; no long distance charges when used on the operator’s
network; no roaming charges when used on the operator’s network; reduced
roaming charges when off the operator’s network; and, in some cases, no extra
roaming charges anywhere.
15-16 In 1998, three of 1997’s top 25 operators in subscribership consolidated with
other carriers.  Furthermore, if deals announced since the release of the Third
Report are completed, five additional operators that were in the top 25 at the
end of 1998 will be consolidated into other carriers.  One of the driving forces
behind many of these consolidations has been the desire of large regional
carriers to enhance their ability to complete effectively with national operators
like AT&T, Sprint PCS, and Nextel.  As was discussed in the Third Report,
operators with larger footprints can achieve economies of scale and increased
efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints.  The need for
increased size was exacerbated in the past year by the introduction and success
of AT&T’s DOR plan and, in particular, its low-cost roaming feature.
According to analysts, it can be significantly more expensive for regional
operators to provide customers with this feature than for national operators.
One obvious way for an operator to reduce roaming costs is by acquiring
licenses covering as much of the country as possible.
23 [A] number of carriers are reporting that DOR plans are beginning to exert
downward price pressure on their roaming rates.  During 1998, carriers have
reported that even though DOR plans have encouraged increased roaming, they
have also led to reductions in the negotiated roaming rate charged to
customers.  In order to remain competitive, carriers expect that they will
continue to proactively renegotiate their reciprocal roaming rates between
operators to reduce rates even further.68
FIFTH ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 8/3/00)
Page Excerpt
10 The Commission previously concluded that operators with larger footprints can
achieve economies of scale and increased efficiencies compared to operators
with smaller footprints.  Such benefits permit companies to introduce and
expand innovative pricing plans such as digital-one-rate type (“DOR”) plans,
reducing prices to consumers.
10 Analysts have drawn similar conclusions, predicting that the current
consolidation will intensify competition among nationwide wireless providers.
11 Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, along with the process of
consolidation, the mobile telephone sector continues to experience heightened
competition as a result of the expansion by broadband PCS carriers and Nextel.
19 According to one analyst report, subscribers with medium-usage level saw the
greatest benefits of price competition during 1999, in contrast from the same
analyst’s report from 1998, where high-usage customers benefited the most.
20 Competition from firms with large or nationwide footprints that are able to
minimize the need for roaming by their customers may be forcing other firms
to lower their roaming rates.
23 [The trend of increasing minutes-of-use] may also indicate thaT-Mobile
telephony is moving away from just complementing existing wireline voice
service and towards competing directly with it.
23 The desire by operators to create nationwide footprints for their chosen digital
technology continued during 1999.  The Fourth Report discussed how this
drive stems from cellular operators needing to improve capacity as well as
increase their advanced service offerings, and from broadband PCS and digital
SMR operators needing to expand their footprints to increase their
competitiveness.
27 Of the 12 companies on the mobile telephone sector’s list of the top 25
operators by subscribership (pro forma year-end 1999) that have consolidated
since the end of 1998, seven were cellular-only operators and two others were
predominantly cellular carriers with broadband PCS operations.  As a result,
the three largest carriers on the pro forma year-end 1999 top 25 subscriber list
controlled systems serving 82 percent of all cellular customers.  The top three
carriers previously had controlled only 40 percent at the end of 1998.
76 Among the major carriers, achieving a national presence and a nationwide
infrastructure are perceived as necessary to respond to consumer demands for
seamless service at reasonable prices.
76 Between December 1998 and December 1999, five of the top 25 operators by
subscribership combined with other carriers.  Furthermore, since the end of
1999, five operators in the year-end 1999 top 25 have merged with other
carriers…  As was the case last year, the two most prominent mergers involved
large regional operators attempting to create nationwide footprints in order to
compete effectively with existing nationwide operators.69
76 Some analysts predict that the current consolidation will intensify competition
among nationwide wireless providers.  Their reasoning is that the cost savings
made possible by operating large scale wireless networks will push these
carriers to extend innovative pricing plans, such as DOR-type plans, to broader
segments of the market.. . . Indeed, there is some evidence that the addition of
new nationwide operators already may be contributing to decreasing prices.
For example, according to one survey, prices declined by approximately eight
percent during the last 6 months of 1999.
76-7 [I]t is important to emphasize that, along with the process of consolidation
across geographic areas, the mobile telephone sector continues to experience
heightened competition within geographic areas as a result of the expansion by
broadband PCS carriers and Nextel.
SIXTH ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 6/20/01)
Page Excerpt
5 In the year 2000, the CMRS industry continued to experience increased
competition and innovation as evidenced by lower prices for consumers and
increased diversity of service offerings.  The process of carriers building
nationwide footprints continues to be a significant trend in the mobile
telephone sector.  The year 2000 saw a number of operators fill in gaps in their
coverage through mergers, acquisitions, and license swaps.  In parallel with the
process of footprint building, mobile telephone operators continue to deploy
their networks in an increasing number of markets, expand their digital
footprints, and develop innovative pricing plans.
13 The Commission previously concluded that operators with larger footprints can
achieve economies of scale and increased efficiencies compared to operators
with smaller footprints.  Such benefits permit companies to introduce and
expand innovative pricing plans such as digital-one-rate type (“DOR”) plans,
reducing prices to consumers.
14 Since the end of 1999, carriers have continued to build nationwide footprints
using combinations, acquisitions, and license swaps.  One of the driving forces
behind many of these transactions has been the desire of large regional carriers
to enhance their ability to compete with existing nationwide operators that
offer attractive nationwide pricing plans.  National operators have also sought
to fill in gaps in their coverage.70
SEVENTH ANNUAL CMRS REPORT
(ADOPTED 6/13/02)
Page Excerpt
4 In 2001, the CMRS industry continued to experience increased competition,
innovation, lower prices for consumers, and increased diversity of service
offerings.  The year saw a number of operators continue to fill in gaps in their
national coverage through mergers, acquisitions, license swaps, and joint
ventures.  In parallel with this process of footprint building, mobile telephone
operators continue to deploy their networks in an increasing number of markets,
expand their digital networks, and develop innovative pricing plans.
6 Finally, in part because of competitive pressures in the marketplace, the average
price of mobile telephone service has declined during the year since the Sixth
Report, continuing the trend of the last several years.  According to the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the price of residential mobile
telephone service declined by 5.5 percent during 2001.  Another survey indicates
that the average revenue per minute of mobile telephone use fell 31 percent
between 2000 and 2001.
13-14 The Commission has concluded previously that operators with larger footprints
can achieve certain economies of scale and increased efficiencies compared to
operators with smaller footprints.  Such benefits along with advances such as
digital technology, have permitted companies to introduce and expand
innovative pricing plans such as digital-one-rate (“DOR”) type plans, reducing
prices to consumers.
Since the end of 1999, carriers have been building nationwide footprints through
various forms of transactions.  One of the driving forces behind many of these
transactions has been the desire of large regional carriers to enhance their ability
to compete with existing nationwide operators that offer attractive nationwide
pricing plans.  More recently, national operators have sought to fill in the gaps in
their coverage areas.
19 In addition, continued downward price trends and continued expansion of mobile
networks into new and existing markets are related in different ways to the level
of competition for mobile telephony customers.  These metrics generally
demonstrate a high level of competition for most consumers.
30 Roaming revenues as a percentage of total service revenue have been declining
for years, from 11 percent reported in December 1997 survey to 5.6 percent in
the June 2001 survey.  CTIA attributes this decline to the growth of DOR plans
and the extended calling areas established by many of the larger carriers.
38 Econ One conducted an analysis in October 2001 of mobile telephony pricing in
rural versus urban markets.  Econ One reviewed the pricing plans of 25 markets
it considered to be rural.  The average population of the rural markets was
95,000, compared to the average population of 4.4 million in the top 25 U.S.
cities.  Econ One found there was virtually no difference in the average monthly
charge for wireless service between the two groups.71
39 In most respects, small market carriers like Dobson are subject to the same
competitive pressures as the large market carriers.  Because of national
advertising and the Internet, consumers all over the country are educated about
nationwide rate plans and services enabled by digital technology and the prices
of wireless handsets.  No matter where they live, customers expect and demand
the diversity of services at competitive rates.
…
Econ One’s pricing study found evidence of this nationwide pricing effect, in
that its study showed no differences in service costs between rural and urban
markets.72
Appendix 2.
Comments from Investment Analysts on the Efficiency
of National Wireless Networks
In 1999, the publicly traded wireless telephone carriers included two national players,
Sprint PCS and Nextel, and four major regional PCS carriers – Aerial Communications,
Omnipoint, Powertel, and Western Wireless.  Analysts noted a disequilibrium:  “Bottom line, the
regional carriers trade at a significant discount.”
134  Reading the market evidence drove Merrill
Lynch to a conclusion regarding economies of geographic scope:
A continued focus on the importance of a national footprint.
There’s little question in our mind that wireless in the US is becoming a national
game.  With one-rate plans offering no roaming and no long distance charges,
national reach appears to be important.
We understand the argument that most people only use their phone locally—but
we also think that people would like to think that they might use their phone
nationally.  Think about it.
Moreover, national pricing is simple to understand.  There is one rate.  Period.
No more roaming charges.  No more long distance charges.  The unknown is
taken out of the equation.  We think that this helps to simplify the purchase
decision.
135
n the intervening years, this observation has played out, as the leading regional wireless phone
companies have been consolidated into the national systems.  VoiceStream (which was spun off
from Western Wireless) purchased Omnipoint in February 2000 and Aerial in May 2000;
Voicestream and Powertel were then both purchased by Deutsche Telekom, creating T-Mobile,
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in May 2001.  Essentially, all four of the leading regional carriers listed by Merrill Lynch in
March 1999 became integrated components of national networks over the next two years.
136
As late as 2001, analysts comparing U.S. wireless penetration to levels achieved in many
European countries were struck by the handicap imposed by small U.S. license areas.  In
distributing cellular franchises across 734 markets, and PCS across 51 (MTAs) or 493 (BTAs),
U.S. regulators undermined national economies of scope.  This imposed a substantial tax on
subscribers.  Legg Mason theorized that “local licenses” were the number one problem faced by
American wireless carriers vis-à-vis their counterparts elsewhere:
Local Licenses.  While most developed countries around the world allocated
wireless licenses on a nationwide basis, the U.S. had done so market by market.
Accordingly, very few wireless carriers have truly nationwide footprints and the
ones that do have yet to build them out completely.  As a result, subscribers often
are forced to roam on the wireless networks of other carriers when they are
outside of their home calling area.  Not only does roaming often result in the loss
of enhanced digital services, but it has historically cost about $0.50 per minute or
more, inhibiting wireless usage.
137
The same report found, conversely, that subscribers had benefitted as consolidation took
place:
… although wireless licenses continue to be allocated on a market-by-market
basis (and potentially on a regional basis, with the upcoming 700 MHz auction),
the number of nationwide carriers has increased materially from just three a year
ago (Sprint PCS, AT&T Wireless, Nextel) to potentially six today (including
Verizon Wireless, Cingular Wireless, and VoiceStream).  Most of these wireless
operators have launched some typie of “One Rate” plan over the last two years,
essentially making high roaming and long distance charges a thing of the past.
138
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